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    Abstract.   Almost all set theorists pay at least lip service to Cantor’s 
definition of a set as a collection of many things into one whole; but empty 
and singleton sets do not fit with it. Adapting Dana Scott’s axiomatization of 
the cumulative theory of types, we present a ‘Cantorian’ system which 
excludes these anomalous sets. We investigate the consequences of their 
omission, examining their claim to a place on grounds of convenience, and 
asking whether their absence is an obstacle to the theory’s ability to represent 
ordered pairs or to support the arithmetization of analysis or the development 
of the theory of cardinals and ordinals. 
 
 
 §1.   Introduction.   We all know of Cantor’s definition of a set as ‘a collection M 
of definite, well-differentiated objects m … into a whole’ ([3], p. 282: all references to 
Cantor are to his 1932 collected works), and the great majority of set theorists pay at 
least lip service to it. Once we think about it, however, we can see that an empty set 
and singletons do not make sense in terms of the definition (see §2 below). In Ch. 14 
of our book Plural Logic [20] we looked at these anomalous sets, observing that 
Cantor did not entertain them and showing that a wide range of arguments in favour 
of admitting them are unsound. This encouraged us to become advocates pro bono 
publico for those who take seriously the idea of sets as collections, by developing a 
theory in which sets must have more than one member, if they are really to be a 
collection of many things into one. We called the result ‘Cantorian set theory’. Since 
we were concerned to illustrate the use of plural language in mathematics, we based 
the theory on an underlying logic which is plural, in the sense that a term may denote 
several things at once, not just one or possibly none. That system may therefore be 
described as the hybrid—half singular, half plural—version of the Cantorian theory. 
Ever since Zermelo’s 1908 axiomatization [28], however, set theory has been pursued 
as a purely singular enterprise, with plural notions never getting a look in. So the 
hybrid version needs to be complemented by one conforming to this singularist style, 
a task we did not carry out in our book. This paper is therefore devoted to singular 
Cantorian set theory, which turns out to present its own issues. 
 Our own opinion on the matter is very different from Cantor’s collection idea. We 
think that taking a set to be a separate thing (Cantor’s ein Ding für sich: pp. 379, 401, 
411, 419) over and above its members is a classic case of being misled by grammar 
(see our [20], Ch. 15). This may well be controversial, but there should be nothing 
controversial about the present paper. Here we have two aims. One is to develop and 
expound a Cantorian system of set theory, restricted to multi-membered sets. The 
other is to examine the consequences of this restriction. The literature takes  
—————— 
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for granted that empty and singleton sets can be defended on grounds of their 
convenience. But to our knowledge no one has yet subjected this to critical scrutiny. 
We also need to investigate whether the exclusion of the anomalous sets is any 
obstacle to the ability of the theory to support the arithmetization of analysis and the 
general theory of cardinal and ordinal numbers. 
 Our vehicle for dealing with the absence of ∅ is the Singular Logic presented in 
§3. Its salient feature is its avoidance of any existential commitment—its topic 
neutrality—achieved through the employment of empty terms, including empty 
valuations of variables. Specifically, we take a paradigm empty term, one which is 
empty by logical necessity, such as ℩x(x≠x), abbreviated here as O. Our contention is 
that all the convenience of expression gained through ∅ can equally well be gained 
through O. But O is not a mere shadow of ∅. For example, while ∅ is an additional 
object, a subset of every set, O is not even a set—it is, literally, nothing, or, as we 
shall frequently say, it is zilch. 
 In §2 we explain why empty and singleton sets do not fit the conception of sets as 
collections, and we summarise Cantor’s own opinion on the matter. In §3 we outline 
our underlying Singular Logic for Cantorian set theory and briefly explain some of its 
virtues. Next come definitions in §§4–5, followed by axioms in §6. We put the 
development of the set theory into the Appendix, but give a précis in §7. In §8 we 
discuss how the theory may be strengthened, while the next three sections address 
applications: ordered pairs in §9, the arithmetization of analysis in §10, and cardinal 
and ordinals in §11. Finally, in §12 we offer an evaluation, comparing our system 
with orthodox theories. 
 
 §2.   The anomalous sets.   To make the paper self-contained, we very briefly 
recapitulate material in our book. First of all we explain why our set theory is aptly 
called Cantorian set theory.  
 For Cantor there was no such thing as an empty set. When describing a putative 
point-set that turns out not to contain any points, he says that strictly speaking it does 
not really exist at all (‘streng genommen als solchen gar nicht vorhanden ist’, p. 146). 
Two point-sets with no point in common do not have an empty intersection; rather 
they have no intersection (‘sie seien ohne Zusammenhang’, p. 145; ‘so sind sie ohne 
Zusammenhang’, p. 146). A finite set does not have an empty derived set; rather it has 
no derived set (‘keine abgeleitete Menge hat’, ‘und hat selbst keine Abgeleitete’, p. 
98). His ‘finite sets’ all contain a first element (p. 145), and every subset of a well-
ordered set has a least member (p. 444). His cardinal and ordinal numbers start with 1 
(pp. 290, 298); a cardinal or ordinal 0 could only come by abstraction from an empty 
set. His definition of β − α for ordinals is qualified by the assumption that α is less 
than β (p. 323).  
 Cantor says very little about singletons except in the paragraph in which he 
introduces the cardinal numbers: 
 
A single thing e0, if we subsume it under the concept of a set E0 = (e0), 
corresponds to a cardinal number which we call ‘one’ and symbolize by 1 … 
One can now unite another thing e1 with E0, calling the union set E1, so that E1 
= (E0, e1) = (e0, e1). The cardinal number of E1 is called ‘two’ and symbolized 
by 2. (pp. 289–90) 
	  
 
The new (   ) notation appears to be a limiting case of his notation for the union of 
disjoint sets (p. 282). This presumes the treatment of e0 as a set, and the equation  
(E0, e1) = (e0, e1) dictates that E0 = e0. In short, although singletons do not fit Cantor’s 
various explanations of ‘set’ with their plurals and ‘many’s and ‘together’s (pp. 150, 
204, 282, 443), he does accept them, but only by identifying the singleton E0 with the 
thing e0 in question. This enables him to extend his grand plan to derive numbers from 
sets to cover 1. His solution is to generalize the definition of set to cover the 
collection of a single object e0 into—what else?— e0 itself. The number 1 is then 
obtained in the regular way by abstraction from individual things regarded as sets.  
 Alas, Frege presented a decisive argument against the general identification of 
singletons with their only members. Consider any two objects a, b. The singleton of 
their pair-set is supposed to have just one member, yet if it is identical to the pair-set, 
it has both a and b as members ([10], §10, n. 17; [11], p. 219). There is no choice, 
then, but to take a different line on singletons once one engages—as Cantor did not—
with a full-blown set theory which deals generally with sets of sets as well as sets of 
ur-elements. The modern conception of a singleton as something distinct from its only 
member avoids Frege’s reductio, but only by giving up on the idea of sets as 
collections. As Erik Stenius observes: ‘does it make sense that a set which has just 
been obtained by “collecting” several objects into one whole, can be collected again 
into a different one?’ ([24], p. 65). More recently, David Lewis complains of 
‘mysterious singletons’: 
 
Here is a just cause for student protest, if ever there was one. This time, he has 
no ‘many’ … Rather he has just one single thing, the element, and he has 
another single thing, the singleton, and nothing he was told gives him the 
slightest guidance about what one thing has to do with the other. Nor did any 
of those familiar examples concern single-membered sets. His introductory 
lesson just does not apply. ([17], p. 30) 
 
So the line we choose is to do without singletons altogether. We show that it is 
sufficient, generally if not always, to use the sole member of the singleton rather than 
the singleton itself, and we introduce a notation which smoothly symbolizes this 
procedure (see §4).  
 Cantor’s exclusion of the empty set is entirely consonant with his most explicit 
description of a set of things as  
 
a separate, unified thing [ein einheitliches Ding für sich] in which those things 
are components or constitutive elements. (p. 379; see also pp. 401, 411 & 419)  
 
Frege, too, thought that if a set is a collection of objects, no objects means no set: 
 
A class, in the sense in which we have so far used the word, consists of 
objects; it is an aggregate, a collective unity, of them; if so, it must vanish 
when these objects vanish. If we burn down all the trees of a wood, we thereby 
burn down the wood. Thus there can be no empty class. ([11], p. 212) 
 
 When Zermelo put the empty set on the map, with Axiom II of his [28], he was not 
dissenting from Frege’s conclusion. In the very act of positing its existence he 
dismisses it as ‘not a genuine set’ (eine uneigentliche Menge). Translators who render 
	  
‘uneigentliche’ as ‘improper’, lumping it with ‘improper subset’ and ‘improper 
fraction’ as if it were merely a limiting or degenerate case, fail to capture the force of 
the adjective. In later letters to Fraenkel, Zermelo’s dismissive attitude is clear: 
 
[The empty set is] not a genuine set and was introduced by me only for formal 
reasons … I increasingly doubt the justifiability of [the empty set]. Perhaps 
one can dispense with it by restricting the axiom of separation in a suitable 
way. Indeed, it serves only the purpose of formal simplification. (Letters cited 
by Ebbinghaus [6], p. 135) 
 
Indeed by the time of Zermelo’s more considered 1930 axiomatization, ‘an arbitrarily 
chosen ur-element takes the place of the null set’ ([29], p. 403), and compare [31] 
where he draws attention to his novel ‘introduction of a basis of ur-elements instead 
of the null set’ (p. 441). As to Zermelo’s question about restricting the axiom of 
separation, it had already been answered by Cantor himself, with his crisp and simple 
formulation: ‘Every sub-multitude of a set is a set [Jede Teilvielheit einer Menge ist 
eine Menge]’ (p. 444). This Cantorian principle emerges as theorem 18 below, and is 
picked out in the Zermelo-style axiomatization of §8.  
 The anomalous status of the empty set and the modern notion of singleton is 
therefore hardly news. So it is no surprise that several authors have changed their 
notion of collection in an attempt to rescue the anomalous sets. The story starts with 
Dedekind’s idea of a set as a container containing its members like a sack (see 
Bernstein in [8], p. 836), which accommodates the empty set as an empty container, 
and helps explain why {a} is not the same as a, since the singleton now has the 
container as an extra component. A recent proponent of the container conception is 
Michael Potter: 
 
Now what if we try to make something out of nothing? A container with 
nothing in it is still a container, and the empty collection is correspondingly a 
collection with no members. ([21], p. 22) 
 
Herbert Enderton starts by defining a set to be ‘a collection of things (called its 
members or elements)’ ([7], p. 1), but brings in the idea of an empty container to 
explain why the singleton of the empty set is distinct from the empty set itself:  
 
the fact that {∅}≠∅ is reflected in the fact that a man with an empty container 
is better off than a man with nothing. ([7], p. 3) 
 
The problem for the container theory is whether there are many containers or one all-
purpose container. Enderton’s example is sufficient to show that there must be many, 
since {∅} is supposed to be a container with an empty container as its content. But 
{∅}≠∅, so there must be two containers involved. The trouble is that once many 
containers are admitted, there is no reason why there cannot be many empty ones. But 
extensionality requires that there be just one empty set.  
 George Boolos and Richard Jeffrey (now endorsed by John Burgess as third co-
author of Computability and Logic) notice this problem with regarding the empty set 
as an empty container and suggest a different account of it:  
 
By courtesy, we regard as enumerable the empty set, ∅, which has no 
members. (The empty set; there is only one. The terminology is a bit 
	  
misleading. It suggests comparison of empty sets with empty containers. But 
sets are more aptly compared with contents, and it should be considered that 
all empty containers have the same null content.) ([2], p. 4).  
 
But on their ‘more apt’ comparison of sets with contents, no contents means no set, 
making nonsense of their reference to ∅. Ian Stewart, who does liken empty sets to 
empty containers, runs into similar trouble when he tries to explain why ‘there is only 
one empty set’ by appealing to the fact that ‘the contents of two empty bags are 
identical’ ([25], p. 47). 
 These authors’ confusion of the empty set with nothing (‘the same null content’, 
‘the contents of two empty bags’) is surprisingly common. Thus John Barrow says 
that we may 
 
define what we mean by the natural numbers in a simple and precise way by 
generating them all from nothing: the empty set … it has enabled us to to 
create all of the numbers from literally nothing, the set with no members. ([1], 
pp. 166–7) 
 
The same idea is found in Keith Devlin’s guide to the axiom of constructibility: 
 
in order to construct the natural numbers we need only make one basic 
existence assumption: namely that nothing exists! … We assumed the 
existence of the empty set (i.e. nothing), and took this to be the number 0. ([5], 
pp. 11–12) 
 
Sadly Boolos and Jeffrey are no longer with us, but Burgess, Stewart, Barrow and 
Devlin need to be told loud and clear: if there is an empty set, it is something, not 
nothing.  
 
 §3.   Singular Logic.   We call the underlying logic set out here ‘Singular Logic’. 
It resembles the classical predicate calculus with identity, description, function signs 
and constants, but is shaped by the belief that a system of logic should be topic 
neutral, i.e. applicable to any subject-matter. The classical system notoriously fails 
this test, since it makes it logically necessary that something exists. We return to this 
and other aspects of topic neutrality after sketching the syntax and semantics of our 
system. 
 The membership predicate ∈ is the only non-logical primitive. The predicates ‘is a 
set’ and ‘is an ur-element’ will both be defined in terms of ∈. This is the language 
needed for the abstract version of the set theory. Each applied version will naturally 
add its own vocabulary of predicates, function signs and constants concerning the 
topic it is designed to deal with. 
 
 
Syntax 
We use a, b, c  as schematic letters for terms of arbitrary complexity, including 
variables standing alone. A, B, C stand for single formulas, and Γ for any number 
(none or one or more) of formulas. 
  
	  
 
(i) Logical vocabulary 
Variables, countably many 
Connectives ¬ → ↔ ∧ ∨, plus brackets for punctuation 
Universal quantifier ∀ 
Description operator ℩ 
Identity, a two-place predicate = 
 
(ii) Non-logical vocabulary 
Membership, a two-place predicate ∈ 
 
(iii) Formation rules 
Variables are terms.  
If x is a variable and A a formula, ℩xA is a term. 
If a and b are terms, a=b and a∈b are formulas. 
If A and B are formulas, so are ¬A, (A→B) etc, with the usual conventions 
for omitting brackets. 
If x is a variable and A a formula, ∀xA is a formula.  
 
(iv) Scope, free and bound occurrences of terms and formulas   
The scope of an occurrence of ∀ or ℩ is defined as the shortest formula or 
term in which it occurs. These operators always occur with a variable 
attached, as in ∀xA or ℩xA, and an occurrence of x is bound if it is within 
the scope of an operator whose attached variable is x; otherwise it is free. 
More generally, an occurrence of a term a or formula A in another term or 
formula is bound if it is within the scope of an operator whose attached 
variable occurs free in a or A; otherwise it is free.   
 
Semantics 
 
(i) Individuals 
The individuals may be any objects; there may be none or one or more. 
 
(ii) Valuation and satisfaction 
For each variable x, val x is an individual or nothing. 
val ∈ is a two-place relation on the individuals. 
val satisfies a∈b iff val ∈ holds between val a and val b. 
val satisfies a=b iff val a is identical to val b. 
val satisfies ¬A iff it does not satisfy A. It satisfies A→B iff it satisfies B 
or does not satisfy A. Similarly for the other connectives. 
val satisfies ∀xA iff every x-variant (see below) of val satisfies A. 
val ℩xA is the individual valʹ′ x if a unique x-variant valʹ′ of val satisfies A; 
otherwise it is nothing. 
 
(iii) Logical truth and logical consequence 
  ⊨ C iff every valuation, over no matter what individuals (none or one or 
more), satisfies C.  
  Γ ⊨ C iff every valuation, over no matter what individuals (none or one or 
more), satisfies C if it satisfies every one of Γ. 
	  
 Besides the usual logical apparatus of connectives and quantification and identity, 
the system features the description operator  ℩ as a primitive, producing descriptions 
with these denotation conditions: if A is true for some unique individual as value of x 
then ℩xA denotes that individual. If there is no such individual, the description is 
empty or, as we shall say, it denotes zilch. Our use of ‘zilch’ here corresponds to the 
unjustly neglected use of ‘nothing’ as a necessarily empty term rather than a 
quantifier. 
 Singular logic allows that there might be nothing at all. Our method for dealing 
with this possibility is to permit variables, and open terms in general, to be empty. 
This has the great advantage of settling the logical status of open formulas without 
disturbing modus ponens (see §11.1 of our [20]). Although the semantics of formulas 
with free variables is thereby affected, the semantics of variable-binding is unaffected. 
For example, ∀xA will be true just in case A is true for every assignment of an 
individual as value of x. When we rephrase this in terms of valuations and 
satisfaction, we must take care of the case where the operative variable x is empty 
under the given valuation. So we need the following clause: 
 
val satisfies ∀xA iff every valuation that differs from val at most in that x has a 
value and in what that value may be, satisfies A. 
 
The valuations on the right-hand side are thus stipulated to assign a value to x even if 
val x is zilch. In the summary of the semantics, we used Benson Mates’s [18] label ‘x-
variant of val’, now understood as abbreviating ‘valuation that differs from val at 
most in that x has a value and in what that value may be’. The clause for the variable-
binding operator ℩ uses the same idea. 
 We have opted to take the universal quantifier as primitive, using it to define the 
existential quantifier in the usual way. Since terms may be empty, we shall want a 
way of expressing existence. We use E! to symbolize it, and define E!a in the familiar 
way via identity, matching the equivalence between ‘a exists’ and ‘a is something’. 
 
Existence   E!a =df ∃x x=a 
 
 In the semantics, we use ‘individual’ in the logical sense to cover any kind of 
object, sets included, not as a synonym for ‘ur-element’. We have avoided singular 
talk of a domain of individuals, conceived as a set, resorting instead to plural talk of 
the individuals themselves. Consequently, in the definitions of logical truth and 
consequence we replace singular quantification over domains—‘over no matter what 
domain’—with plural quantification over individuals—‘over no matter what 
individuals (none or one or more)’. One reason for this change is that it would be 
something of an own goal to develop a set theory that rules out empty and singleton 
sets, only to find them reappearing in the semantics as domains. The second reason is 
topic-neutrality, now operating at the other extreme of size. We want our logic to be 
applicable to reasoning about kinds of things that have so many instances that they do 
not form a set. Indeed our set theory is a case in point, since there is no such thing as 
the set to which everything belongs. The reader will also note that in the definition of 
logical consequence we use plural language, treating the premises as a number of 
formulas rather than a set. Here the use of the plural is not demanded by topic 
neutrality, but rather serves to replace redundant and unnatural talk of sets. It also 
avoids invoking empty and singleton sets when there are no premises or just one.  
	  
 The use of plural quantification in the semantic metalanguage means that it is 
expressively richer than the singular object language. It also outstrips the object 
language in a quite different direction, as we shall now explain. For the sake of 
convenience, we have used ‘valuation’ or val as an umbrella word covering the 
assignment of values to items of two different syntactic categories: terms and 
predicates. For a term a as argument, val a is an individual or zilch. It is thus a partial 
function. For the predicate ∈ as argument, val ∈ is a two-place relation on the 
individuals, in the sense that for any individuals x, y the relation either holds or does 
not hold between x (or zilch) and y (or zilch) as arguments. In contrast, standard 
presentations of the semantics for the predicate calculus assign set-theoretic 
extensions to predicates as their semantic values, e.g. a set of ordered pairs to a two-
place predicate, where the ordered pairs are themselves reduced to plain sets by one or 
other familiar method. Unfortunately for everybody, there is no such thing as the set 
of the ordered pairs <x, y> for which x∈y. That is why we reinstate the relations for 
which the set-theoretic extensions were at best artificial surrogates, conceiving of 
them, like Frege’s Begriffe, as different from objects, and thus not as values of first-
order variables (for more examples of predicates without set-theoretic extensions, see 
theorem 39 in the Appendix below). Functions, such as val, are like relations in this 
respect. Thus generalizing over valuations involves second- (or higher-) order 
quantification in the semantic metalanguage.  
 The following deductive system for Singular Logic is sound and complete. The 
axioms are all the instances of the following schemes, both as they stand and prefaced 
by any number of universal quantifications. 
 
 
 1 A where A is tautologous 
 2 ∀x(A→B) → (∀xA → ∀xB) 
 3 A → ∀xA where x is not free in A 
 4 ∀xA(x) → (E!a → A(a)) where A(a) has free a wherever A(x) has free x 
 5 ∀x(x=x) 
 6 a=b → (A(a) ↔ A(b)) where A(b) has free b at zero or more places where A(a) 
has free a 
 7 ¬E!a ∧ ¬E!b → (A(a) ↔ A(b)) where A(b) has free b at zero or more places 
where A(a) has free a 
 8 a=b → E!a ∧ E!b 
 9 ∀y(y=℩xA ↔ ∀x(A ↔ x=y)) where y does not occur in ℩xA 
 
 Rule of inference. From A and A→B infer B. 
 
  
 The interested reader may consult the Appendix of Ch. 11 to our [20] for 
soundness and completeness proofs. It is worth remarking that our proof of 
completeness does without set-theoretic machinery, and so there are no empty or 
singleton sets needed there either. As already mentioned, we treat a premise or 
premises as a formula or formulas rather than a set. Likewise, we define a deduction 
as a single formula or a sequence of several, thereby avoiding the need for singletons. 
We also replace the construction of a maximal set of formulas with one referring to its 
members, and instead of invoking equivalence classes as individuals in the treatment 
of identity, we use representative items.  
	  
 In the same chapter we prove several metatheorems that we take for granted in 
what follows, e.g. change of bound variables and extensionality (substitutivity of 
equivalents). Of particular interest is metatheorem 5 (‘Open formulas and schemes’) 
 
Γ(x) ⊢A(x) if and only if Γ(a) ⊢A(a) for all terms a for which Γ(a) and A(a) have 
free a just where Γ(x) and A(x) have free x 
 
which means that a single theorem featuring a free variable can do duty for a theorem 
scheme with infinitely many instances, and similarly for deducibility. We make 
extensive use of open formulas in what follows. 
 
 §4.   Initial definitions.   Here we comment on initial definitions before discussing 
those needed for the theory of levels in the next section. A summary list of definitions 
can be found at the beginning of the Appendix. Throughout, these definitions are to be 
understood as including the familiar provisos to prevent unintended capture of 
variables. As usual, slashed two-place predicates are convenient shorthand: a∉b 
abbreviates ¬(a∈b), etc. 
 As well as defining ∃ in terms of ∀, we use identity to define two more quantifiers: 
 
‘Exactly one’ quantifier  ∃1xA(x) =df ∃x∀y(A(y)↔x=y) 
‘Many’ quantifier   mxA(x) =df ∃x∃y(x≠y ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y)) 
 
The quantifier ∃1 may be read as ‘there is exactly one’, or simply ‘one’, while m may 
be read as ‘there are many’ or simply ‘many’, taking ‘many’ in its weakest sense as 
equivalent to ‘more than one’, i.e. at least two. The semantics of ℩ means that E!℩xA(x) 
is equivalent to ∃1xA(x). 
 We call an n-place predicate F strong at its i-th place if it is necessary that if 
Fa1…an then ai exists; otherwise it is weak at that place. We think that it is not for 
logic to determine the strength of places of primitive non-logical predicates. Hence ∈, 
like any two-place predicate, may be assigned a relation that holds of zilch at one or 
both of its places. Since, however, under its intended meaning ∈ is strong at both 
places, we shall add a non-logical axiom to ensure its strength (axiom 1(i) in §6 
below).  
 As to the sole primitive logical predicate =, we must fix its meaning and therefore 
need to make a choice. We opt to make = strong at both places, so that a=b is satisfied 
only if both a and b exist. This is embodied in the definition of E! in §3. Since the 
corresponding notion of weak identity also proves invaluable, we use = and E! to 
define a symbol for it: 
 
Weak identity   a≡b =df a=b ∨ (¬E!a ∧ ¬E!b) 
 
The identities a=b and a≡b only differ when a and b are both empty, so we can move 
freely between them when either or both terms are non-empty. For example, if we 
define a term c by d, the definition on its own only allows us to infer the weak identity 
c≡d, since no term is guaranteed to be non-empty. But if we are also given that d 
exists, we can go on to infer the strong identity c=d. As we explain in §11.4 of our 
[20], working the other way round is equally viable, taking weak identity as primitive 
and defining strong identity in terms of it.  
	  
 We symbolize the paradigm empty term ‘zilch’ by an italic capital O. Although O 
may be taken as a primitive constant, we opt to define it as a description: 
 
Zilch    O =df  ℩x(x≠x) 
 
The description ℩x(x≠x) is necessarily empty on account of the logically unsatisfiable 
condition x≠x and the semantics of ℩. Hence E!O and O=O are both logically false, 
while O≡O is logically true. Also a≡O is equivalent to ¬E!a, and therefore provides 
another way to express non-existence. 
 We need to emphasize that O does not denote anything whatever, however special 
or recondite. It denotes zilch, that is to say, it denotes nothing. In particular, it should 
not be confused with ∅ as this symbol is conventionally understood, namely as 
standing for the empty set, which is something, not nothing. O plays a pivotal role in 
our set theory, where it is not simply an empty surrogate for the non-empty ∅. For 
more on zilch see our [20], pp. 111–14 & 120–28.  
 The quantifications ∀xA(x) and ∃xA(x) do not cover the case A(O); a predicate true 
of everything, or true of something, may or may not be true of zilch. As a useful 
supplement to the standard quantifiers, then, we introduce ‘inclusive’ quantifiers ∀O 
and ∃O to cover the undecided case. 
 
Inclusive quantifiers  ∀OxA(x) =df ∀xA(x) ∧ A(O) 
     ∃OxA(x) =df ∃xA(x) ∨ A(O) 
 
The quantifier m can be used to define the notion of a set, since in the absence of the 
empty set and singletons, sets can be characterised as multi-membered objects. We 
symbolize ‘a is a set’ by Ma, after Cantor’s Menge. 
 
Set    Ma =df mx x∈a 
 
M is a strong predicate by the definition of m and the strength of ∈. We symbolize  
‘a is an ur-element’ by Ua, and define it in terms of E! and M: 
 
Ur-element   Ua =df E!a ∧ ¬Ma 
 
U is thus a strong predicate too. Together, U and M provide a mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive classification of the individuals. Next come familiar definitions of 
subset ⊆ and proper subset ⊂. They mean that ⊆ and ⊂ are strong at both places.  
 
Subset    a⊆b =df Ma ∧ ∀x(x∈a→x∈b) 
Proper subset   a⊂b =df a⊆b ∧ a≠b 
 
The set abstract {x:A(x)} is defined, using the description operator, in an obvious way: 
 
Set abstraction  {x:A(x)} =df   ℩z(Mz∧ ∀x(x∈z↔A(x)) 
 
Like any term, {x:A(x)} may be empty. One cause of emptiness is when A(x) is 
satisfied by too few things to form a set (i.e. none or one). But it may also be satisfied 
by too many, e.g. {x:Mx} is empty because there is no set of all sets (for further 
examples see theorem 39 in the Appendix). 
	  
 We also define a second kind of abstract [x:A(x)] which is designed to provide an 
acceptable alternative to Cantor’s untenable identification of singletons with their sole 
members. If A(x) is satisfied by a unique object, [x:A(x)] denotes that object. As with 
the case of O and ∅, [x:A(x)] is not simply a surrogate for{x:A(x)} but leads a life of 
its own.  
 
Modified set abstraction [x:A(x)] =df   ℩z(z=℩xA(x) ∨ z={x:A(x)}) 
   
This is used to define the intersection a∩b of sets a and b as the object that is either 
their sole common member (not its singleton) or the set of their many common 
members. If there is no common member, there is no such thing as a∩b, i.e. a∩b≡O. 
 
Intersection   a∩b =df [x: x∈a ∧ x∈b] 
 
Definitions of other operations are given in the Appendix. It should be acknowledged 
that the resulting algebra of sets is decidedly more complicated than the familiar 
Boolean one. But to our surprise we found that the entire development in the 
Appendix makes no use whatever of such an algebra. We suspect that its 
omnipresence in the textbooks is more as an advertisement for the versatility of 
Boolean algebra than in providing a tool for serious work.  
 
 §5.   Levels.   In his 1930 paper ‘On boundary numbers and domains of sets’, 
Zermelo uses a new technique to establish isomorphisms between models of his set-
theoretic axioms. He describes it as the ‘development’ of a domain:  
 
its decomposition into a well-ordered sequence of separated ‘layers’ where the 
sets belonging to one layer are always ‘rooted’ in the preceding layers such 
that their elements lie in those layers, and they themselves, in turn, serve as 
material for subsequent layers ([29], p. 401) 
 
Corresponding to each exclusive layer (Schicht), there is a cumulative segment 
(Abschnitt) or ‘partial domain’, which is the union of all preceding layers. The 
segments are none other than the cumulative types now familiar from presentations of 
the iterative conception of set.  
 In ‘Axiomatizing set theory’ Dana Scott picks up on Zermelo’s cumulative 
segments, which he calls ‘levels’ (sometimes ‘type levels’ or simply ‘types’), 
claiming that the theory of levels provides an ‘intuitive justification’ ([23], p. 208) for 
set theory in which ‘the artificial, “ad hoc” axioms have been completely avoided’ 
([23], p. 212), and regretting that Zermelo still did not give levels the prominence they 
deserve. In fact, Zermelo did just that in his draft ‘On the set-theoretic model’ [30], 
which however was still unpublished at the time Scott wrote. Scott’s contribution is 
novel in three respects. He proceeds entirely in terms of cumulative levels with no 
recourse to Zermelo’s exclusive layers; he offers an axiomatization of the theory of 
levels from which Zermelo’s original ‘artificial ad hoc’ axioms can be derived as 
theorems; and he does so without relying on ordinals. Later improvements on Scott’s 
ideas were made by John Derrick in unpublished work and Michael Potter in his book 
Set Theory and its Philosophy [21]. What we shall call the Scott/Derrick/Potter theory 
is our starting point in what follows. Like them, we operate with a first-order 
framework, dropping Zermelo’s appeal to second-order ideas in his 1930 works. 
 When empty and singleton sets are omitted, the cumulative hierarchy of levels can 
	  
be informally characterized as follows. Levels are sets and they are well-ordered by 
∈. It is convenient to reserve the variables u, v, w for levels. We say that u is lower 
than v (v is higher than u) if u∈v. The members of a level are all the ur-elements 
together with all the members and subsets of the lower levels. In short, a level is the 
accumulation of the lower levels.      
 Since the first or lowest level has no lower levels, it is the set of all ur-elements. In 
the literature, this first level is generally labelled V0. We, however, will call it V1 since 
we think it should properly be indexed with 1 for ‘first’ (Zermelo, as it happens, 
labelled his first segment P1). This also enables us to reserve V0 for a more principled  
use as standing for zilch. 
 The hierarchy is cumulative, since a member or subset of any level is also a 
member or subset of all higher levels. It is exhaustive, since every object is located 
within it: every set is a subset of some level and also a member of some level, while 
every ur-element is a member of every level. It is also infinite: for every level there is 
a higher one. So if there are any levels at all, there are infinitely many.  
 Whether there are any levels, or sets of any kind, depends on the number of ur-
elements. If there are many (i.e. at least two), levels exist. If there are none or just 
one, there are no sets at all. In this respect, our hierarchy differs from that of 
Scott/Derrick/Potter. Although they rightly allow for ur-elements, they also have 
empty and singleton sets to start the ball rolling even without any ur-elements. 
 Our task is to systematize this informal conception of levels by designing suitable 
definitions and axioms. Scott’s plan was to take ‘is a level’ to be primitive and govern 
it by an axiom ensuring that a level is the accumulation of the lower ones. But a more 
attractive option is to find a definition of level that makes the axiom redundant. The 
key is the intermediate notion of a history. One first defines accumulation, then 
history in terms of accumulation, and finally a level as the accumulation of a history. 
This is Derrick’s idea, as subsequently improved on by Potter. We adopt this broad 
strategy, but in the absence of empty and singleton sets, we have had to rework the 
whole theory of levels from scratch. It is by no means a matter of inserting an 
occasional restriction or making other minor adjustments. There are significant 
differences at every point: underlying logic, primitive vocabulary, definitions, axioms, 
lemmas, theorems. Consequently, the development presented in the Appendix differs 
substantially from Potter’s own, both in global organization and locally in the 
strategies required to prove particular theorems. Later we comment in detail on some 
of these differences (see especially §12 and the comments on the proofs of theorems 4 
and 6 in the Appendix), but some brief comparisons are in order here. 
 Like us, Scott and Potter work with a first-order underlying logic, including 
identity as a logical constant and permitting variables to range over any objects 
whatever. Neither, however, pauses to articulate the logical framework, being content 
to operate in a decidedly informal manner without a fully specified syntax or 
semantics. It is clear, though, that both violate topic neutrality by requiring domains to 
be non-empty. Scott also rules out empty terms, while Potter allows that some kinds 
of term—descriptions but not constants—may be empty.  
 As to vocabulary, both take ∈ as primitive. Scott takes ‘is a level’ as primitive, 
while Potter defines it. Scott also presupposes ‘is a set’ as a third primitive, when he 
uses a, b, c … as restricted variables ranging over sets in contrast to his unrestricted 
variables x, y, z … which range over all objects, ur-elements included ([23], p. 207). 
This notation enables him to characterize an ur-element x as a non-set (¬∃a x=a), and 
thus distinguish it from the empty set. Potter’s second primitive is the predicate U (‘is 
an ur-element’, or ‘is an individual’ in his terminology). He uses it to distinguish an 
	  
ur-element from the empty set, noting that those who do without a second primitive 
‘are unable to distinguish formally between ∅ and an individual, since individuals, we 
may suppose, share with ∅ the property of having no members’ ([21], p. 60).  
 In contrast, we can get by with ∈ as our sole primitive, using it to define both ‘is a 
set’ and ‘is an ur-element’. Our definitions mean that there are no individuals besides 
sets and ur-elements. This was Scott’s assumption. Potter also allows for 
‘ungrounded’ or ‘non-well-founded’ collections which lie outside the hierarchy of 
levels and thus are neither ur-elements nor sets. Consequently, he starts by defining 
the more general idea of ‘collection’, characterizing a set as a subcollection of some 
level. But even his broader notion of ‘collection’ is not the opposite of ‘ur-element’, 
since he also allows for a fourth possible kind of thing that is neither ur-element, set 
nor ungrounded collection. He finds no use for them, however, nor for ungrounded 
collections, and we have omitted both here. We conjecture that Potter’s ultra-liberal 
ontology is partly motivated by a desire to economize on axioms. For example, by 
defining sets as grounded collections, he avoids the need for Scott’s restriction axiom, 
which ensures that any set is a subset of some level. Potter would also need an extra 
axiom to rule out things that are neither collections nor ur-elements. Yet another 
axiom would be needed to ensure that ur-elements do not have members, but Potter 
opts to forgo it despite thinking it true.  
 We now turn to our approach to defining ‘is a level’. We talked of ‘the lower 
levels’ when we characterized a level as the accumulation of all the lower ones. The 
plural description ‘the lower levels’ covers three cases: (i) zilch for those lower than 
the first level V1; (ii) the single level V1 for those lower than the second level V2; and 
(iii) many levels for those lower than any other level. Since we are operating with a 
purely singular object language, we must find a singular replacement for the plural 
description ‘the lower levels’. Naturally, Potter’s choice is ‘the set of lower levels’. 
For him, the set of levels lower than a level v is a history, and v is the accumulation of 
this history. He thereby equates a history with a set in every case: the empty set for 
case (i), the singleton {V1} for (ii), and multi-membered sets for (iii). We, however, 
treat the three cases separately, leaving the first two as they are and employing a set 
only in case (iii), to replace the many lower levels with the set to which they belong. 
All three cases are covered by the single abstract [w:w∈v], which (i) is empty if no 
level is lower than v, or (ii) denotes the single level lower than v if such there be, or 
(iii) denotes the set of levels lower than v if there are many such levels.  
 The upshot is that we can take over Potter’s definition of accumulation ([21], p. 
41) as follows 
 
Acc function   acc a =df {z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈a ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))} 
 
By itself, however, acc does not do the whole job. It delivers the right result for any 
level higher than V2, for then the relevant a will be the set of all lower levels. But it 
will not work for V2 with its sole lower level V1. We want V2 to be the accumulation 
of V1, but the condition y∈a picks out the members of V1, not V1 itself. Since V1 is the 
set of ur-elements, and nothing is a member or subset of any ur-element, the result is 
that acc V1 ={z:Uz}=V1, not V2. Potter, since he admits singletons, gets the right result 
with V2=acc {V1}. We need to follow a different course, replacing y∈a by y=a in the 
definition, thereby introducing a second accumulation function which simplifies to  
     
Accum function  accum a =df {z:(Uz ∨ z∈a ∨ z⊆a)} 
	  
 
V2 can then be defined to give the desired result: 
 
Second level   V2 =df  accum V1 
 
This leaves V1, which is the accumulation of its history, namely zilch. Again we use 
accum to define it: 
 
First level   V1 =df  accum O 
 
Although we have defined them separately, it is worth remarking that acc can be 
defined in terms of accum as follows 
 
acc a =df {z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈a ∧ z∈accum y))} 
 
The functions expressed by acc and accum may be partial functions, since if there is 
but one ur-element, acc and accum both map it to zilch. They may also be ‘co-partial’ 
functions, mapping zilch to {z:Uz} (for more see §5.6 of our [20]).  
 We say that a is an accumulation (symbolized by 𝒜a) if it is of the form accum x 
or acc x. Remembering that x may be zilch, we use the inclusive quantifier ∃O to 
define it: 
      
Accumulation predicate 𝒜a=df ∃Ox (a=accum x ∨ a=acc x) 
 
Next, in the spirit of Derrick, we need to define ‘a is a history’ (symbolized by Ha) 
without appealing to the notion of level: 
 
History  Ha =df  (a≡O ∨ Ma) ∧ (a=V1 ∨ ∀y(y∈a→( y=V1 ∨ y=V2 
 → y=accum a∩y) ∧ (y≠V1 ∧ y≠V2 → y=acc a∩y))) 
 
This definition needs a little explanation. Naturally we deal separately with the 
possibility that y is either V1 or V2 by replacing acc by accum for these exceptional 
cases. But we also need to bring in the possibility that a is V1. The problem is the 
same as before. Any member y of V1 is an ur-element and is therefore neither V1 nor 
V2. But no ur-element y is acc a∩y, since the function acc only has sets as values. 
 It is convenient to reserve the variables h, h1 for histories. If V1=accum h, we say 
that V1 has h has a history; similarly for V2. If v is any level other than V1 or V2, and 
v=acc h, we say that v has h as a history. We want any level v to have [w:w∈v] as its 
unique history, but uniqueness is liable to fail if we count an ur-element x as a history. 
For supposing V1 exists, V1=accum O and also V1=accum x. In order to rule this out, 
the initial conjunct in the definition requires that a history, if it exists at all, be a set.  
 Finally, the definition of ‘a is a level’ (symbolized by Va). It should be no surprise 
that the exceptional levels V1 and V2 are dealt with separately, while the rest can be 
characterized as acc x for some history x 
 
Level   Va =df  a=V1 ∨ a=V2 ∨ ∃x(Hx ∧ a=acc x) 
 
The definitions secure that accumulations and levels are sets, and that  𝒜 and V, like 
M, are strong. But H is weak, since the history of V1 is O. 
	  
 There are three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive kinds of level: the first 
level V1, levels next above a level, and limit levels. We define the level next above a 
(symbolized by aʹ′) to be the lowest level that is higher than the level a. 
 
Level next above aʹ′=df  ℩x(Va ∧ Vx ∧ a∈x ∧ ¬∃y(Vy ∧ y∈x ∧ a∈y)) 
 
We define ‘a is a limit level’ (symbolized by La) as ‘a is a level that is neither V1 nor 
next above any level’.  
 
Limit level  La=df  Va ∧ a≠V1 ∧ ¬∃x a=xʹ′ 
 
 §6.   Axioms.   The axioms are all the instances of the following schemes, both as 
they stand and prefaced by any number of universal quantifications, and are to be 
understood as including the familiar provisos to prevent unintended capture of 
variables. Recall that we use the variables u, v, w for levels, so that e.g. ∀uA(u) is 
short for ∀x(Vx→A(x)). 
 
 
1 Membership   (i)  x∈y → E!x ∧ E!y 
     (ii)  My ∧ Mz → ∀x(x∈y↔x∈z) → y=z 
(iii)  x∉x 
(iv)  ∃x x∈y → My 
 
2 Levels   (i)  mxUx → M{x:Ux} 
     (ii)  ∃xMx → mxUx 
     (iii)  M{x:A(x)} ↔ mxA(x) ∧ ∃u∀x(A(x) → x∈u) 
     (iv)  ∀u∃v u∈v 
     (v) ∃xVx → ∃xLx 
 
 The first group of axioms govern membership. 1(i) ensures that ∈ is strong at both 
places. 1(ii) is extensionality for sets. 1(iii) rules out self-membership, while 1(iv) 
rules out singletons, i.e. there is no y such that x∈y for just one x. 
 The second group are principles governing levels. Together with other axioms, 2(i) 
ensures that if many ur-elements exist, so does the set of them, i.e. V1 exists. 2(ii) says 
that there are no sets, and hence no levels, unless there are many ur-elements. The 
scheme 2(iii) gives necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of levels for {x:A(x)} 
to be a set, namely that there are many As and there is some level such that each A is a 
member of it. The ← half is thus a useful principle of separation from levels. 2(iv) is 
Potter’s ‘axiom of creation’—for every level there is a higher one—from which it 
follows that there are infinitely many levels if there are any at all. 2(v) is a limit level 
axiom, which asserts the existence of a limit level if there are any levels at all.  
 
 §7.   Development of the theory.   We put the detailed development of the theory 
of levels into the Appendix. Unsurprisingly, given the definitional set-up, a recurrent 
feature of the proofs is the separate treatment of the first two levels V1 and V2. We 
prepare the ground for this by including their main peculiarities in the last of the 
opening lemmas.  
 Some preliminary theorems about accumulations and histories lead to the well-
foundedness of membership on any history (theorem 6). This is the first of three 
	  
foundation principles of increasing generality. It is narrowly concerned with subsets 
of histories, whereas the foundation scheme for levels (theorem 12) covers any 
specifiable property of levels, and foundation for sets (theorem 17) covers sets in 
general. In our development, theorem 6 is the linchpin: it is used to prove theorem 12, 
which in turn is used to prove theorem 17. In the Appendix we explain how our proof 
of theorem 6 differs substantially from Potter’s as a result of our restriction of 
separation from levels to exclude empty and singleton sets.  
 From theorem 6 it follows that levels are transitive (theorem 7) and hereditary 
(theorem 8) sets. Membership between levels is irreflexive (axiom 1(iii)), transitive 
(theorem 7) and well-founded (theorem 12), and levels are comparable under 
membership (theorem 13). Hence membership well-orders the levels. So too does the 
proper subset relation (theorem 27).  
 A level v has [w:w∈v] as its unique history (theorems 10, 11 and 15). Given many 
ur-elements, the lowest level of all is V1—the set of ur-elements (theorem 28). For any 
level v, there is a level vʹ′ next above v (theorem 29), whose members are the ur-
elements together with the subsets of v. Equivalently, vʹ′ is the set of all the members 
and subsets of v (theorem 30), or as we shall say, vʹ′ is the power-plus set of v, 
symbolized by P+(v). The third kind of level, a limit level, exists whenever there are 
any levels at all, i.e. provided there are many individuals (33), and is the union of its 
history (34).  
 How do objects fit into the hierarchy of levels? Every ur-element is a member of 
every level (corollary (ii) of theorem 1). Every set is a member of some level 
(theorem 23) and also a subset of some level (theorem 16(i)). If a set bears either 
relation to a level, it bears the same relation to every higher one (theorem 7 and its 
corollary, and theorem 8). If a set is a member of a level, it also a subset of it 
(corollary of theorem 7). But not vice versa. For any set, there is a unique lowest level 
of which it is a subset—the level of the set for short (theorem 16(ii). For any set, there 
is a unique lowest level of which it is a member (theorem 23): it is not the level of the 
set, but the level next above (theorem 31). 	   Looking at matters from the outside, the well-ordering of levels means that they 
can be indexed by ordinals, with the cumulative hierarchy of levels defined by 
transfinite recursion: 
 
 V1 = {x:Ux} 
 Vα+1 = P+(Vα) where α is any ordinal 
 Vλ = ∪β<α Vβ where λ is a limit ordinal 
 
The position of objects (their ‘height’) within the hierarchy is then measured by 
assigning ordinals to them as ranks. Thus α is the rank of a given object if Vα+1 is the 
lowest level of which it is a member. In particular, the rank of an ur-element is 0.  
 Along the way we prove analogues of several axioms of Zermelo-style set theory: 
foundation or regularity (theorem 12), Cantorian separation (18), union (21 and 22), 
pairing (24) and power set (25). Although these theorems are recognizably close 
relatives of the conventional axioms, they are framed to suit the present context. In 
Foundation, the usual restriction to non-empty sets is now redundant. The Separation 
scheme now follows Cantor’s requirement that the separated members be many. In 
the same vein, Pairing requires that the members of the putative pair be distinct, and 
	  
Power Set requires the initial set to have many subsets, which is not true of pair sets in 
the absence of empty and singleton subsets.  
 Towards the end of the Appendix we provide a representation of ordered pairs as 
plain sets, which easily generalizes to n-tuples, and prove that it is adequate (theorem 
38). Finally, we prove a non-existence theorem (39), which means that none of the 
key predicates E!, M, V, 𝒜 and H has a set as its extension.  
 
 §8.   The Axiom of Plurality and other axioms.   The abstract version of the set 
theory we are presenting allows for ur-elements but makes no assumptions about their 
number or nature, and is thus as close to being logic as it is possible to get. All the 
axioms are true when there are no ur-elements, and hence nothing at all, or when there 
is just one ur-element, and hence no sets. It follows that orthodox set theory cannot be 
interpreted within the Cantorian theory, since the former implies that sets exist, 
whereas the latter makes no existential claims. Allen Hazen [15] has claimed that 
reference to empty and singleton sets can be regarded as a façon de parler for talk 
about multi-membered sets. But even apart from the vitiating artificiality of his 
translation of ∈, evidently this will not work here.   
 The weakest additional axiom that will guarantee the existence of sets is the Axiom 
of Plurality, which asserts the existence of at least two individuals: 
 
Axiom of Plurality  mx x=x 
 
Taken in isolation, this axiom is weaker than the more specific mxUx, but the two are 
equivalent in context. Adding the Axiom of Plurality to the rest secures a transfinite 
hierarchy of sets, despite its being vastly more modest than Whitehead and Russell’s 
axiom of infinity. The reason is that it works in tandem with the limit level axiom 2(v) 
to entail the existence of a limit level (theorem 33), and therefore the existence of the 
lowest one Vω (theorem 35). Since Vω is a set with all the finite levels among its 
members, the Axiom of Plurality and the limit level axiom 2(v) function together to 
yield an unconditional Zermelo-style axiom of infinity. As to the other axioms of 
Zermelo set theory, our axiom 1(ii) is extensionality, while axiom 2(i) secures the 
existence of the set of ur-elements provided there are many of them. As we remarked 
in the previous section, appropriate analogues of separation, foundation, union, 
pairing and power set are derivable as theorems. For those more familiar with a 
Zermelo-style axiomatization, it may be helpful to set down our versions of the 
standard axioms.  On the right, we indicate their location in the present development. 
 
 
Extensionality  My ∧ Mz → ∀x(x∈y↔x∈z) → y=z  axiom 1(ii) 
 
Ur-elements  mxUx → M{x:Ux}    axiom 2(i) 
 
Foundation  Mx → ∃y(y∈x ∧ x∩y≡O)   theorem 17 
 
Cantorian Separation Mx ∧ my(y∈x ∧ A(y)) → M{y:y∈x ∧ A(y)} theorem 18 
 
Union   Mx ∧ ∀y(y∈x→My) → M(∪x)   theorem 22 
 
Pairing   E!x ∧ E!y ∧ x≠y → M{x, y}   theorem 24 
 
	  
Power set  my y⊆x →M(P(x))    theorem 25 
 
Infinity   mx x=x → ∃x(V1∈x ∧ ∀v(v∈x→vʹ′∈x))   theorems 33, 35, 36 
 
 
 This leaves choice and replacement, which need to be secured by new axioms. The 
first may be expressed as: for any set of pairwise disjoint sets, there is a choice set that 
has exactly one member in common with each member of the original set. This is the 
same as the familiar version, except that we do not need to add that the pairwise 
disjoint sets are non-empty. Formalizing the principle in the current framework 
requires two departures from the conventional presentation. First, we express 
disjointness of sets using zilch (y∩z≡O) not the empty set. Second, we spell out the 
character of the choice set directly, rather than take the usual detour via singleton 
intersections. 
 
Axiom of Choice ∀x((Mx ∧ ∀y(y∈x→My) ∧ ∀y∀z((y∈x ∧ z∈x ∧ 
y≠z)→y∩z≡O)) → ∃y∀z(z∈x→∃1z1(z1∈z∧ z1∈y))) 
 
As to replacement, the conventional scheme needs only a slight tweak, to require that 
there are many replacement members, just as the Cantorian separation scheme 
requires many separated members: 
 
Axiom of Replacement ∀x∃1yA(x, y) → ∀x((Mx ∧ mz∃y(y∈x ∧ A(y, z)))→ 
E!{z:∃y(y∈x ∧ A(y, z))}) 
 
 §9.   Ordered pairs.   Once one has to hand the set of natural numbers N (see 
§10), the arithmetization of analysis can be carried through within Cantorian set 
theory. Playing on the aphorism of Cantor’s nemesis Kronecker, alles andere ist 
Mengenwerk. The notion of an ordered pair is essential to the project. But we cannot 
adopt Kuratowski’s now standard definition of <a, b> as {{a}, {a, b}}, since it needs 
singletons. Hausdorff’s ([14], p. 32) earlier version uses a pair-set of pair-sets 
equipped with 1 and 2 as markers, where 1 and 2 are arbitrarily chosen distinct objects 
which serve to identify a as the first coordinate and b as the second: <a, b> =df {{a, 
1}, {b, 2}}. Hausdorff sacrifices generality by requiring that neither a nor b is 1 or 2. 
In fact, his definition is adequate when 1 and 2 are allowed back in as coordinates, but 
it then requires singletons. In any case the revised definition is still not truly general, 
since it cannot accommodate zilch. To illustrate the problem, <O, b> = {{O, 1}, {b, 
2}} = {{1}, {b, 2}} = {{1, 1}, {b, 2}} = <1, b>. Kuratowski’s definition is likewise 
deficient, since <a, O> = {{a}, {a, O}} = {{a}, {a}} = {{a}, {a, a}} = <a, a>.  
 Allowing a or b in <a, b> to be zilch is highly convenient, since it avoids the need 
to establish that a and b are non-empty prior to using the ordered pair notation. In §11 
below, we include zilch as a coordinate in structures regarded as ordered pairs. Zilch 
also provides for representations of partial and co-partial functions as sets of ordered 
pairs, where the first or ‘argument’ coordinate may be zilch in the co-partial case, and 
the second or ‘value’ coordinate may be zilch in the partial one. These representations 
are convenient, since the information that and where a function is partial, for example, 
is determined by the set of ordered pairs itself and does not need a second, extraneous 
specification (‘on a set X’).  
 To give a fully general representation of ordered pairs, we rework Hausdorff’s 
technique and use the markers 1 and 2 thrice over. We also exploit the denotational 
	  
behaviour of [   ] abstracts as opposed to {   } abstracts (see lemma 2 in the 
Appendix). First, then, we define [a, b] by analogy with {a, b} as [z:z=a ∨ z=b]. It 
follows that [a, b]={a, b} provided E!a and E!b and a≠b. But [a, O]≡[O, a]≡[a, a]≡a, 
whereas {a, O}≡{O, a}≡{a, a}≡O. Next we use [   ] abstracts to define the ordered 
pair <a, b> as {{{[a, 1], [a, 2]}, 1}, {{[b, 1], [b, 2]}, 2}}. We then prove (theorem 38) 
that it is adequate for any choice of coordinates a and b—ur-element, set, or even 
zilch. Singletons are not needed. In particular, none of <a, a>, <a, O>, <O, a> reduces 
to {a}. The definition can be naturally generalised to cover ordered n-tuples by using 
markers 1, 2, …, n, thereby avoiding the conventional identification of n-tuples with 
iterated ordered pairs, which conflates different kinds of thing.  
 The markers 1 and 2 can themselves be coordinates of ordered pairs. But what are 
they? One option is to take them to be ur-elements, perhaps natural numbers, though 
in truth any pair of ur-elements will do. This course, however, must use numerals or 
some other kind of term to pick out the chosen ur-elements, which means that the 
language has to be extended. Also the proofs that ordered pairs exist and have their 
so-called characteristic property will depend on, say, the hypothesis U1∧ U2 ∧ 1≠2, 
which is stronger than the Axiom of Plurality. A second option, the one we adopt, is 
to take the markers to be sets that can already be identified and distinguished using 
the resources of the original language. The obvious candidates are the first two levels, 
V1 and V2. The relevant proofs then depend only on the Axiom of Plurality.  
 
 §10.   Arithmetization of analysis.   With ordered pairs to hand, we can go on to 
define the Cartesian product a×b of sets a, b and prove its existence. Then a typical 
constructional path will identify (i) the set of integers Z with a set of infinite 
equivalence classes of members of N×N under the operation of subtraction; (ii) the set 
of rationals Q with a set of infinite equivalence classes of members of Z×Z- under 
division, where Z- comprises the non-zero integers; (iii) the set of reals R with the set 
of lower Dedekind sections (i.e. infinite subsets of Q); (iv) the set of complex 
numbers C with R×R. Given the Axiom of Plurality, the existence of Z and Q can be 
proved within our theory by routine applications of Cantorian separation from the 
power set of the relevant products, the existence of R by separation from the power 
set of Q, and the existence of C follows from the existence of products in general.   
 Most authorities think that it is perfectly legitimate to postulate the natural 
numbers (or some other number system) as ur-elements. Landau, for example, opens 
his classic Foundations of Analysis with ‘We assume [the set of natural numbers] to 
be given’ ([16], p. 1). Similarly, when Gödel is explaining the iterative conception of 
sets he takes it for granted that sets are obtained ‘from the integers (or some other 
well-defined objects)’ ([12], p. 180). And Paul Cohen agrees that ‘a very reasonable 
position would be to accept the integers as primitive entities and then use sets to form 
higher entities’ ([4], p. 50).  
 A minority follow Frege and Principia in constructing a set-theoretical 
representation of the natural numbers themselves, nowadays typically using the finite 
von Neumann ordinals ∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} and so on, with an 
axiom of infinity providing for the set to which they all belong. This particular 
representation is obviously not available within our theory. But, as noted in §8, once 
we add the Axiom of Plurality, it follows that Vω exists. We say that a is inductive if 
(i) V1∈a and (ii) ∀v(v∈a→vʹ′∈a), and prove that Vω is inductive (theorem 36). It 
follows that there is an inductive set N*, which has as its members just those things 
belonging to every inductive set (theorem 37). N* is none other than the set of the 
	  
finite levels, i.e. the history of Vω. We define the set of natural numbers to be N*, 
with 0 defined as V1 and the successor of v as vʹ′. Given these definitions, it is 
straightforward to derive Peano’s axioms as theorems. 
 
 §11.   Cardinals and ordinals.   It is conventional to define ‘a is a cardinal 
number’ as ‘a is the cardinal number of b (card b for short) for some set b’. Cardinal 
numbers are thus ascribed to sets and count their members. In the absence of empty 
and singleton sets, we tweak the definition by making 0 the number of zilch and 1 the 
number of any ur-element, keeping the rest as numbers of members of a set.  
 We identify the finite cardinals with the natural numbers taken as ur-elements. 
Then card a, where a may be zilch or an ur-element or a finite set, is defined to be the 
natural number n if a and [z: z∈N ∧ z<n] are equinumerous.  But the modified set 
abstract [z: z∈N ∧ z<n] denotes zilch when a is zilch and its cardinal number is 0, and 
it denotes 0 when a is an ur-element and its cardinal number is 1. So we tweak the 
standard definition of equinumerosity by adding that every ur-element is 
equinumerous with every ur-element and nothing else, and zilch is equinumerous only 
with itself. 
 As to infinite cardinals, we use Scott’s idea [22] to represent them as equivalence 
classes of infinite sets under equinumerosity, à la Frege and Principia but avoiding 
problems of size. For any infinite set a, there is a unique lowest level v that has some 
subset equinumerous with a. So card a can be defined as the set of sets equinumerous 
with a whose level is v.  
 The standard definitions of addition, multiplication etc make use of representatives 
whose cardinal numbers are the arguments of the defined functions. Since these 
representatives now include zilch and ur-elements, the definitions require tweaking. 
First we define a∈b as (a=b ∧ Ub) ∨ a∈b, and a⋓b as [z: z∈a ∨ z∈b], and redefine ‘a 
and b are disjoint’ as ¬∃z(z∈a ∧ z∈b). Then, for example, we can define α+β as card 
(a⋓b), where card a = α and card b = β and a and b are disjoint and may be zilch or 
ur-elements or sets. 
 Similar techniques are used in the treatment of ordinals. They are conventionally 
ascribed to well-ordered structures, where these are defined to be ordered pairs 
consisting of a set and a well-ordering on it. In the absence of empty and singleton 
sets, we need to extend the definition to cover zilch and ur-elements. It is usual to deal 
with these cases by making the empty set well-order the empty set as well as any 
singleton. We replace this artificiality with one of our own, making zilch well-order 
both zilch and any ur-element. The singleton of an ordered pair as the well-ordering 
of a pair set will be replaced by the ordered pair itself. We go on to redefine 
isomorphism between well-ordered structures to take account of zilch and ur-
elements. Finite ordinals are identified with the natural numbers, and infinite ones 
constructed à la Scott. It is a routine matter to extend the definitions of addition, 
multiplication etc to take account of the new coordinates in structures.  
 
 §12.   Evaluation.   Our theory has a small number of simple and transparent 
axioms. Likewise its underlying logic.  Of course, variations can be obtained by 
redesigning the definitions or redistributing the content of the axioms or redividing 
the labour between underlying logic and definitions and axioms. To take just two 
examples, the strength of ∈ may be secured by the logic rather than by a non-logical 
axiom, and M may be redefined so that extensionality for sets drops out as a theorem. 
	  
 The theory can serve the needs of ordinary pure and applied mathematics, 
providing an auxiliary superstructure of sets for reasoning about any chosen ur-
elements. With the natural numbers taken as ur-elements, it is also adequate for the 
arithmetization of analysis and the theory of transfinite numbers (§§9–11); the reader 
can follow us in checking that there is no use of the anomalous sets. Alternatively, the 
natural numbers themselves can be represented by sets provided there are at least two 
individuals. They cannot, of course, be represented as pure sets, but we do not see this 
as a significant loss (see §14.6 of our [20]).  
 The techniques used to develop and apply the theory are straightforward to handle 
and do not introduce any new kind of individual (remember zilch is, literally, 
nothing). Where the conventional set theorist has the empty set, the singleton set, and 
the multi-membered set, we can generally replace the first with zilch and the second 
with the sole member of the singleton. That was how we treated the histories of V1 
and V2 in §5, and how we avoided empty and singleton sets as intersections. The [   ] 
notation allows us to deal with all three cases in one go, and provides a convenient 
surrogate for conventional set abstraction where necessary. We emphasize again that 
when we replace the empty set by zilch, we are not identifying the two, which would 
be to conflate something with nothing. Although there is sometimes almost a straight 
swap, as when x∩y=∅ is replaced by x∩y≡O, their behaviour diverges starkly 
elsewhere. For example, it is standard to take the empty set to be a subset of every set, 
whereas zilch is nothing and not a subset of anything. Similarly, when we replace 
singletons with their sole members in certain contexts, we are not misidentifying the 
two. After all, {a} is a subset of the pair-set {a, b} in conventional set theory, but a is 
never a subset of {a, b} in ours.  
 Our presentation is designed to facilitate comparison with rival systems. In 
particular, one may compare Cantorian set theory with a theory in the style of 
Scott/Derrick/Potter, admitting empty and singleton sets. It turns out that there are 
pros and cons to either theory with respect to simplicity. As to vocabulary, where we 
have a single, natural primitive ∈, they need M or U as a second primitive (see §5). 
Their definitional set-up, on the other hand, can be simpler than ours. We 
distinguished two accumulation functions, explicitly defined the first two levels, and 
then treated them separately in the definitions of history and level. In contrast, 
Scott/Derrick/Potter can define Va more simply as ∃x(Hx ∧ a=acc x) with Ha defined 
as ∀y(y∈a→(y=acc a∩y)), where ∩ is given the standard definition which admits 
empty and singleton intersections. As to axioms, their theory replaces the conditional 
2(i) by its unconditional consequent, since {x:Ux} remains a set even when there is 
but one ur-element or none. And similarly the conjunct mxA(x) is no longer needed on 
the right hand side of the scheme 2(iii). The amended version delivers unrestricted 
separation, which makes axiom 1(iii) redundant. Axiom 1(iv) is not needed, since 
they admit singletons. Axiom 2(ii) is also dropped, since the existence of sets is no 
longer dependent on there being many ur-elements or even any. On the other hand, 
the Scott/Derrick/Potter theory needs extra axioms to prevent ur-elements from 
having members, and to ensure that its second primitive M or U is strong. Our 
analogues of the traditional Zermelo-style axioms are sometimes more complicated 
than theirs. Witness the versions of separation, pairing, power set and replacement 
discussed in §8. On the other hand, we avoid the complications caused by the empty 
set in the foundation and choice principles and the definition of generalized 
intersection.  
 Abraham Fraenkel argues that ‘if we do not want to state an exception—and the 
mathematician, in contrast to the grammarian, abhors exceptions’, we shall want the 
	  
axiom of separation to cover the case where the separating property is not true of any 
member of the original set. The axiom thereby yields the empty set as a subset of the 
original ([9], p. 23). He has evidently forgotten that in Cantor’s own formulation of 
separation—‘every sub-multitude of a set is a set’—there is no hint of ‘stating an 
exception’. Subsequently Fraenkel gives an example of the utility of the empty set 
itself in avoiding exceptions: 
 
had we not introduced the null-set, we would not be able to maintain that the 
meet of any sequence (or set) of sets is again a set. ([9], p. 27) 
 
As one might expect, plugging the exceptions by invoking an exceptional object only 
creates further exceptions. Take Ø as an instance of Fraenkel’s exceptionless ‘any set 
of sets’. Trivially, everything is a member of every member of an empty set, so the 
meet of Ø will be the universal set. But there is no such thing: his example backfires 
spectacularly. We think the sanest comment on the whole question of exceptions is 
Halmos’s:  
 
There is no profound problem here; it is merely a nuisance to be forced always 
to be making qualifications and exceptions just because some set somewhere 
along some construction might turn out to be empty. There is nothing to be 
done about this; it is just a fact of life. ([13], pp. 18–19) 
 
 In any discussion of inconvenience, the cost must be weighed against the gain in 
coherence. Countless authors introduce their subject by repeating Cantor’s definition 
of sets as collections. It is simply not true that they understand a set to be ‘nothing but 
an object of which one knows no more and wants to know no more than what follows 
about it from the postulates’ ([27], p. 395). Their theories need to cohere with the 
informal conception that motivates them. Admitting empty and singleton sets is at 
odds with their Cantorian conception, and arguments from convenience do nothing to 
remove this tension.  
 
 
  
	  
APPENDIX 
 
For ease of reference we summarise the definitions given so far and also repeat the 
set-theoretic axioms. Like the definitions and axioms, the following results and proofs 
are to be understood as including the familiar provisos to prevent unintended capture 
of variables.  
 Our proofs are often longer than those in Potter’s [21]. For the most part, the 
difference is only superficial, since it results from our relatively slower and more 
cautious approach to deduction. There is some relative inconvenience in developing 
the theory of levels, since we have to deal with the first two levels separately from the 
rest, particularly in the early stages. But now that we have done the work the reader is 
spared the trouble.  
 This inconvenience is not intrinsic to the project of excluding the anomalous sets. 
It is peculiar to the singular version of Cantorian set theory. The version based on 
plural logic which we presented in our [20] does not suffer this trouble.  
 
 
Definitions  
 
Existential quantifier    ∃xA =df ¬∀x¬A 
‘Exactly one’ quantifier  ∃1xA(x) =df ∃x∀y(A(y)↔x=y) 
‘Many’ quantifier   mxA(x) =df ∃x∃y(x≠y ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y)) 
 
Existence   E!a =df ∃x x=a 
Weak identity   a≡b =df a=b ∨ (¬E!a ∧ ¬E!b) 
 
Zilch    O =df  ℩x(x≠x) 
Inclusive quantifiers  ∀OxA(x) =df ∀xA(x) ∧ A(O) 
     ∃OxA(x) =df ∃xA(x) ∨ A(O) 
 
Set    Ma =df mx x∈a 
Ur-element   Ua =df E!a ∧ ¬Ma 
 
Subset    a⊆b =df Ma ∧ ∀x(x∈a→x∈b) 
Proper subset   a⊂b =df a⊆b ∧ a≠b           
 
Set abstraction  {x:A(x)} =df   ℩z(Mz ∧ ∀x(x∈z↔A(x)) 
     [x:A(x)] =df   ℩z(z=℩xA(x) ∨ z={x:A(x)}) 
 
Intersection   a∩b =df [x: x∈a ∧ x∈b] 
 
Accumulation   accum a =df {z:(Uz ∨ z∈a ∨ z⊆a)} 
acc a =df {z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈a ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))} 
     𝒜a =df ∃Ox (a=accum x ∨ a=acc x) 
      
First level   V1 =df   accum O 
Second level   V2 =df   accum V1 
 
	  
History  Ha =df  (a≡O ∨ Ma) ∧ (a=V1 ∨ ∀y(y∈a→( y=V1 ∨ y=V2 
 → y=accum a∩y) ∧ (y≠V1 ∧ y≠V2 → y=acc a∩y))) 
 
Level    Va =df  a=V1 ∨ a=V2 ∨ ∃x(Hx ∧ a=acc x) 
 
Level next above  aʹ′=df  ℩x(Va ∧ Vx ∧ a∈x ∧ ¬∃y(Vy ∧ y∈x ∧ a∈y)) 
 
Limit level   La=df  Va ∧ a≠V1 ∧ ¬∃x a=xʹ′ 
 
 
 
Axioms 
 
1 Membership   (i)  x∈y → E!x ∧ E!y 
     (ii)  My ∧ Mz → ∀x(x∈y↔x∈z) → y=z 
(iii)  x∉x 
(iv)  ∃x x∈y → My 
 
2 Levels   (i)  mxUx → M{x:Ux} 
     (ii)  ∃xMx → mxUx 
     (iii)  M{x:A(x)} ↔ mxA(x) ∧ ∃u∀x(A(x) → x∈u) 
     (iv)  ∀u∃v u∈v 
     (v) ∃xVx → ∃xLx   
 
 
 
Lemmas  
 
 LEMMA 1.   Extensionality for abstracts   
 (i) ∀x(A(x)↔B(x)) → {x:A(x)}≡{x:B(x)} 
 (ii)   ∀x(A(x)↔B(x)) → [x:A(x)]≡[x:B(x)] 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Suppose ∀x(A(x)↔B(x)). Then ℩z(Mz ∧ ∀x(x∈z↔A(x)) ≡ ℩z(Mz ∧ 
∀x(x∈z↔B(x)). So by the definition of the abstracts, {x:A(x)}≡{x:B(x)}. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   Suppose ∀x(A(x)↔B(x)). Then ℩y(y=℩xA(x) ∨ y=℩z(Mz ∧ 
∀x(x∈z↔A(x))) ≡ ℩y(y=℩xB(x) ∨ y=℩z(Mz ∧ ∀x(x∈z↔B(x))). So by the definition of 
the abstracts, [x:A(x)]≡[x:B(x)]. 
 
 
 LEMMA 2.  [   ] abstracts  
 (i) ¬∃xA(x) → [x:A(x)]≡O 
 (ii) ∃1xA(x) → [x:A(x)]=℩xA(x)  
 (iii) mxA(x) → [x:A(x)]≡{x:A(x)}  
 
This lemma spells out the denotation of an abstract [x:A(x)] according to the number 
of things—none, one or more—satisfying the embedded formula A(x). 
 
	  
 PROOF OF (i).   Suppose ¬∃xA(x). Then ¬E!℩xA(x). Also from ¬∃xA(x) it follows 
that ¬mxA(x), whence ¬E!{x:A(x)} by the definitions of the abstract and M. Hence 
¬∃z(z=℩xA(x) ∨ z={x:A(x)}), whence ¬E!℩z(z=℩xA(x) ∨ z={x:A(x)}). Hence [x:A(x)]≡O 
by the definition of the abstract.  
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   Suppose ∃1xA(x). Then ∃1y y=℩xA(x). For a reductio suppose 
E!{x:A(x)}. Then by the definitions of the abstract and M, mxA(x). Contradiction. 
Hence ¬E!{x:A(x)}. Hence by the strength of identity ∃1z(z=℩xA(x) ∨ z={x:A(x)}), 
whence E!℩z(z=℩xA(x) ∨ z={x:A(x)}). Also by the strength of identity (z=℩xA(x) ∨ 
z={x:A(x)}) ↔ z=℩xA(x). Hence ℩z(z=℩xA(x) ∨ z={x:A(x)}) = ℩z(z=℩xA(x)) = ℩xA(x), 
whence [x:A(x)] = ℩xA(x) by the definition of the abstract. 
 
 PROOF OF (iii).   Suppose mxA(x). Then ¬∃1xA(x), whence ¬E!℩xA(x). Hence by the 
strength of identity (y=℩xA(x) ∨ y={x:A(x)}) ↔ y={x:A(x)}, whence ℩y(y=℩xA(x) ∨ 
y={x:A(x)}) ≡ ℩y(y={x:A(x)}) ≡ {x:A(x)}. Hence [x:A(x)] ≡ {x:A(x)} by the definition 
of the abstract. 
 
 
 LEMMA 3.  Existence E!a ↔ Ua ∨ Ma 
         
The → half means that the individuals divide exhaustively into ur-elements and sets. 
The ← half expresses the strength of the predicates U and M. 
 
 PROOF. 
1  For the → half, suppose E!a. Also suppose ¬Ma. Then by definition Ua, a fortiori  
 Ua ∨ Ma. 
2  For the ← half, suppose Ua ∨ Ma. By definition, if Ua then E!a, and if Ma then  
 mx x∈a, whence by axiom 1(i) E!a again. 
 
 
 LEMMA 4.  Abstraction and Reduction  
 (i)  a={x:A(x)} ↔  Ma ∧ ∀y(y∈a↔A(y)) 
 (ii) mxA(x) ∧ a=[x:A(x)]  ↔  Ma ∧ ∀y(y∈a↔A(y)) 
 
 PROOF OF (i).  
1  For the → half, suppose a={x:A(x)}. Then by the definition of the abstract, a=℩z(Mz 
∧ ∀y(y∈z↔A(y)), whence Ma ∧ ∀y(y∈a↔A(y)). 
2  For the ← half, suppose Ma ∧ ∀y(y∈a↔A(y)). Then by lemma 3 E!a. For a 
reductio suppose Mx ∧ ∀y(y∈x↔A(y)) for some x≠a. Then ∀y(y∈x↔y∈a), 
whence x=a by axiom 1(ii). Contradiction. Hence a = ℩z(Mz ∧ ∀y(y∈z↔A(y))). So 
a={x:A(x)} by the definition of the abstract. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   
1  For the → half, suppose mxA(x) ∧ a=[x:A(x)]. Then by lemma 2(iii) a={x:A(x)}, 
whence by lemma 4(i), Ma ∧ ∀y(y∈a↔A(y)).  
2  For the ← half, suppose Ma ∧ ∀y(y∈a↔A(y)). Then by lemma 4(i) a={x:A(x)}, 
whence E!{x:A(x)} by the strength of identity. Hence mxA(x) by the definitions of 
the abstract and M, whence a=[x:A(x)] by lemma 2(iii). 
	  
 LEMMA 5. Membership (i)  a∈b→Mb    
     (ii)  a={x:x∈a}↔Ma 
 
Part (ii) allows for movement between different expressions for a set, with {x:x∈a} 
sometimes being the most convenient form. 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Suppose a∈b. Then by axiom 1(i) E!a. Hence ∃x x∈b, whence Mb 
by axiom 1(iv). 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).  
1  For the → half, suppose a={x:x∈a}. Then Ma by lemma 4(i).  
2  For the ← half, suppose Ma. Since ∀x(x∈a↔x∈a), it follows that a={x:x∈a} by 
lemma 4(i). 
 
 
 LEMMA 6.  Subset  (i) a⊆b→Mb 
     (ii) Ma↔a⊆a 
     (iii) a⊂b→∃x(x∉a ∧ x∈b) 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Suppose a⊆b. Then Ma by the definition of ⊆, whence mx x∈a by 
the definition of M. Also ∀x(x∈a→x∈b) by the definition of ⊆. Hence mx x∈b, 
whence Mb by the definition of M. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).  
1  For the → half suppose Ma. Since ∀x(x∈a→x∈a), it follows by the definition of ⊆ 
that a⊆a. 
2  For the ← half suppose a⊆a. Then Ma by the definition of ⊆. 
 
 PROOF OF (iii).   Suppose a⊂b. Then a⊆b and a≠b by the definition of ⊂, whence 
Ma and ∀x(x∈a→x∈b) by the definition of ⊆. By lemma 6(i), Mb. For a reductio 
suppose that ∀x(x∈b→x∈a). Then by axiom 1(ii), a=b. Contradiction. Hence ∃x(x∉a 
∧ x∈b). 
 
 
 LEMMA 7.  The first two levels  (i)  V1≡{z:Uz}≡acc O≡acc V1 
      (ii) E!V1 → MV1 ∧ ∀y(y∈V1↔Uy) 
      (iii) Ma →V1={z:Uz} 
      (iv) V2≡{z:Uz ∨ z⊆V1} 
      (v) E!V2 → MV2 ∧ ∀y(y∈V2↔(Uy ∨ y⊆V1)) 
      (vi) E!V2→E!V1 
      (vii) E!V2→V1∈V2  
      (viii) V1≠V2 
 
 PROOF OF (i).  
1 By definition V1 ≡ accum O ≡ {z:Uz ∨ z∈O ∨ z⊆O}. Since ¬E!O, it follows by 
lemmas 3, 5(i) and 6(i) that ¬∃x(x∈O ∨ x⊆O). Hence (Uz ∨ z∈O ∨ z⊆O)↔Uz, 
whence V1≡{z:Uz} by lemma 1(i).  
	  
2 By the definition of acc, acc O≡{z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈O ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. Since ¬∃y y∈O, 
it follows that (Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈O ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))↔Uz, whence acc O≡{z:Uz} by lemma 
1(i).  
3 By the definition of acc, acc V1≡{z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈V1 ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. If y∈V1 then 
E!V1 by axiom 1(i), whence Uy by lemma 4(i). Hence ¬My by the definition of U, 
whence ¬∃z(z∈y ∨ z⊆y) by lemmas 5(i) and 6(i). Hence (Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈V1 ∧ (z∈y ∨ 
z⊆y)))}↔Uz, whence acc V1 ≡{z:Uz} by lemma 1(i). 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   Suppose E!V1. Then V1={z:Uz} by lemma 7(i). Hence MV1 ∧ 
∀y(y∈V1↔Uy) by lemma 4(i).  
 
 PROOF OF (iii).   Suppose Ma. Then E!a by lemma 3, whence ∃xMx. Hence 
M{z:Uz} by axioms 2(i) and 2(ii). Hence E!{z:Uz} by lemma 3, whence V1={z:Uz} by 
lemma 7(i).  
 
 PROOF OF (iv).   By definition V2 ≡ accum V1 ≡ {z:(Uz ∨ z∈V1 ∨ z⊆V1)}. If ¬E!V1 
then ¬∃y y∈V1 by axiom 1(i). If E!V1 then z∈V1↔Uz by lemma 7(ii). So either way 
(Uz ∨ z∈V1 ∨ z⊆V1)↔(Uz ∨ z⊆V1). Hence V2 ≡ {z: Uz ∨ z⊆V1} by lemma 1(i).  
 
 PROOF OF (v).   Suppose E!V2. Then V2={z:(Uz ∨ z⊆V1)} by lemma 7(iv). Hence 
MV2 ∧ ∀y(y∈V2↔(Uy ∨ y⊆V1)) by lemma 4(i). 
 
 PROOF OF (vi).   Suppose E!V2. Then MV2 by lemma 7(v), whence V1={z:Uz} by 
lemma 7(iii), whence E!V1 by the strength of identity. 
 
 PROOF OF (vii).   Suppose E!V2. Then E!V1 by lemma 7(vi), whence MV1 by lemma 
7(ii). Hence V1⊆V1 by lemma 6(ii), whence V1∈V2 by lemma 7(v). 
 
 PROOF OF (viii).   For a reductio suppose V1=V2. Then E!V1 and E!V2 by the 
strength of identity. Hence V1∈V2 by lemma 7(vii), whence V1∈V1. By lemma 7(ii) 
UV1, whence ¬MV1 by the definition of U. But MV1 also by lemma 7(ii). 
Contradiction. Hence V1≠V2.  
 
 
 
Theorems 	  
 THEOREM 1. Accumulations (i) 𝒜x→Mx	  
 (ii) 𝒜x→∀z(Uz→z∈x) 
 (iii) Vx→𝒜x 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Suppose 𝒜x. If x=accum y, then x={z:(Uz ∨ z∈y ∨ z⊆y)} by the 
definition of accum, whence Mx by lemma 4(i). Similarly for the other case x=acc y.  
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   Suppose 𝒜x. If x=accum y, then x={z:(Uz ∨ z∈y ∨ z⊆y)} by the 
definition of accum, whence ∀z(Uz→z∈x) by lemma 4(i). Similarly for the other case 
x=acc y. 
 
	  
 PROOF OF (iii).   Suppose Vx. Then x=V1 ∨ x=V2 ∨ ∃y x=acc y by the definition of 
V, whence 𝒜x by the definitions of 𝒜, V1 and V2. 
 
 COROLLARIES.   Let Vx. Then (i) Mx and (ii) ∀z(Uz→z∈x). 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Immediate by theorems 1(i) and (iii). 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).  Immediate by theorem 1(ii) and (iii). 
 
 
Recall that we reserve u, v, w for levels, and h, h1 for histories.  
 
 THEOREM 2.  Histories I  Let v=acc h. Then (i) x∈h → x∈v 
  (ii) v≠V1 → Mh ∧ h≠V1. 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Suppose x∈h. By axiom 1(i) it follows that E!x, whence Ux ∨ Mx 
by lemma 3. Suppose Ux. Then a fortiori Ux ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (x∈y ∨ x⊆y)). Suppose 
instead that Mx. Then by lemma 6(ii), x⊆x. Since x∈h, it follows that Ux ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ 
(x∈y ∨ x⊆y)). So either way Ux ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (x∈y ∨ x⊆y)). By the definition of acc, 
v=acc h= {x:(Ux ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (x∈y ∨ x⊆y)))}, whence x∈v by lemma 4(i). 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   Suppose v≠V1. For a reductio suppose h≡O. Then v=acc h=acc 
O=V1 by lemma 7(i). Contradiction. Hence Mh by the definition of H. For a reductio 
suppose h=V1. Then v=acc h=acc V1=V1 by lemma 7(i). Contradiction. Hence h≠V1. 
 
 
 THEOREM 3.  Histories II   Let h≠V1 and x∈h. Then Mx. 
 
 PROOF.   Since by hypothesis h≠V1 and x∈h, it follows that 𝒜x by the definitions 
of H and 𝒜, whence Mx by theorem 1(i). 
 
 
 THEOREM 4.  Histories III Let h≠V1, x∈h, x≠V1 and x≠V2. Then  
(i) x=acc h∩x  
(ii) E!h∩x  
(iii) mz(z∈h ∧ z∈x). 
 
Part (iii) of the theorem plays an important role in several subsequent proofs, where 
we shall need to infer y∈h∩x from y∈h ∧ y∈x, or vice versa, or to infer that h∩x is 
the set {y: y∈h ∧ y∈x}. Given our definition of ∩, these inferences may fail, since 
when there is but one common member y of h and x, the intersection h∩x is y itself 
(not y’s singleton as per the orthodox definition of ∩). This is the one place that doing 
without singletons presents a serious challenge. In order for the inferences to go 
through, we need to have established that there are many common members of h and 
x. Part (iii) does this, subject to the conditions laid down in the hypothesis. In step 3 of 
its proof, axiom 1(iii) x∉x is used for the first time, to argue for the distinctness of a 
set from any of its members. 
 
	  
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Since by hypothesis h≠V1 and x∈h and x≠V1 and x≠V2, it follows by 
the definition of H that x=acc h∩x. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   For a reductio suppose that h∩x≡O. Then by theorem 4(i) x=acc O, 
whence x=V1 by lemma 7(i).  Contradiction. Hence E!h∩x. 
 
 PROOF OF (iii). 
1 By theorem 4(ii) E!h∩x, and so by the definition of ∩ and lemma 2(i), either 
∃1z(z∈h ∧ z∈x) or mz(z∈h ∧ z∈x). For a reductio suppose that z1∈h ∧ z1∈x for 
some unique z1. Then by the definition of ∩ and lemma 2(ii), h∩x=z1. Hence by 
theorem 4(i) x=acc z1.  
2 For a reductio suppose h∩z1≡O. Since h≠V1 and z1∈h, it follows by the definition 
of H that z1=accum h∩z1 or z1=acc h∩z1. Suppose z1=accum h∩z1. Then z1=accum 
O=V1 by the definition of V1. Suppose z1=acc h∩z1. Then z1=acc O=V1 by lemma 
7(i). So either way z1=V1. Hence x=acc z1=acc V1, whence by lemma 7(i), x=V1. 
Contradiction. Hence E!h∩z1. 
3 Returning to the reductio initiated in step 1, since E!h∩z1 it follows by the 
definition of ∩ and lemma 2(i) that z2∈h ∧ z2∈z1 for some z2. By axiom 1(iii), 
z2≠z1, and by the definition of acc, x=acc z1={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈z1 ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. 
Since h≠V1 and z2∈h, it follows by theorem 3 that Mz2. Hence by lemma 6(ii), 
z2⊆z2. Since z2∈z1 and z2⊆z2, it follows that z2∈x by lemma 4(i). Hence z1∈h and 
z1∈x and z2∈h and z2∈x and z2≠z1. Contradiction. Hence mz(z∈h ∧ z∈x). 
 
 
 THEOREM 5.  Histories IV Let h≠V1 and x∈h. Then H(h∩x) and Vx. 
 
 PROOF.   By hypothesis x∈h, whence E!x by axiom 1(i), and also V1={z:Uz} by 
lemmas 5(i) and 7(iii). We consider three cases separately: (i) x=V1, (ii) x=V2, (iii) 
x≠V1 and x≠V2. 
 
Case (i) x=V1  
Since x=V1 it follows that Vx by the definition of V, and also that x={z:Uz}. Hence 
y∈x→Uy by lemma 4(i). Also y∈h→¬Uy by theorem 3 and the definition of U, 
whence ¬∃z(z∈h ∧ z∈x). Hence by lemma 2(i) and the definition of ∩, h∩x≡O, 
whence H(h∩x) by the definition of H.  
 
Case (ii) x=V2 
1 Since x=V2 it follows that Vx by the definition of V. Since h≠V1 and x∈h, then 
x=accum h∩x by the definition of H. 
2 For a reductio suppose that h∩x≡O. Then x=accum O=V1 by the definition of V1. 
But by lemma 7(viii), V1≠V2. Contradiction. Hence E!h∩x.  
3 Since h∩x =df [y: y∈h ∧ y∈x], it follows that E![y: y∈h ∧ y∈x], whence by lemma 
2(i), y∈h ∧ y∈x for some y. We shall prove that there is exactly one such y, namely 
V1. 
4 Since x=V2, it follows by lemma 7(iv) that x={z: Uz ∨ z⊆V1}={z: Uz ∨ 
z⊆{z1:Uz1}}. Since y∈x, it follows by lemma 4(i) that Uy ∨ y⊆{z1:Uz1}. Since 
y∈h, it follows by theorem 3 and the definition of U that ¬Uy. Hence y⊆{z1:Uz1}.  
	  
5 For a reductio suppose that y⊂{z1:Uz1}. Then by lemma 6(iii), y1∈{z1:Uz1} and 
y1∉y for some y1, whence by lemma 4(i), Uy1 and y1∉y. By lemmas 7(ii) and (v), 
∀x(Ux→x∈V1) and ∀x(Ux→x∈V2), whence y≠V1 and y≠V2. Since h≠V1 and y∈h 
and y≠V1 and y≠V2, it follows that y=acc h∩y={x:(Ux ∨ ∃y(y∈h∩y ∧ (x∈y ∨ 
x⊆y)))} by the definitions of H and acc. Since Uy1, it follows by lemma 4(i) that 
y1∈y. Contradiction. Hence y⊄{z1:Uz1}. Since y⊆{z1:Uz1}, it follows by the 
definition of ⊂ that y={z1:Uz1}=V1, whence V1 = ℩y(y∈h ∧ y∈x). Hence ∃1y(y∈h ∧ 
y∈x), whence by lemma 2(ii) and the definition of ∩, h∩x = V1. Hence H(h∩x) by 
the definition of H. 
 
Case (iii) x≠V1 and x≠V2 
1  By theorems 4(i), (ii), and (iii), x=acc h∩x, E!h∩x, and mz(z∈h ∧ z∈x). By the 
definition of ∩ and lemma 2(iii), h∩x={z: z∈h ∧ z∈x}. Hence M(h∩x) by lemma 
4(i), whence mz z∈h∩x by the definition of M. 
2  Consider an arbitrary z1 such that z1∈h∩x. Then z∈z1→∃y(y∈h∩x ∧ z∈y), a 
fortiori z∈z1→ (Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h∩x ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). By the definition of acc, x=acc 
h∩x={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h∩x ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. Hence by lemma 4(i), z∈z1→z∈x. By 
the definition of ∩, (h∩x)∩z1≡[y:y∈[y1:y1∈h ∧ y1∈x] ∧ y∈z1], whence 
(h∩x)∩z1≡[y: y∈h ∧ y∈x ∧ y∈z1] by lemmas 1(ii) and 4(ii) and (from step 1) 
mz(z∈h ∧ z∈x). Since z∈z1→z∈x, it follows by lemma 1(ii) that (h∩x)∩z1≡[y: y∈h 
∧ y∈z1], whence (h∩x)∩z1≡h∩z1 by the definition of ∩. 
3 Since z1∈h∩x, it follows from the definition of ∩ that z1∈[z:z∈h ∧ z∈x], whence 
z1∈h by lemma 4(ii) and (from step 1) mz(z∈h ∧ z∈x). Suppose z1=V1 ∨ z1=V2. 
Since h≠V1 and z1∈h, then z1=accum h∩z1 by the definition of H, whence 
z1=accum (h∩x)∩z1. Suppose instead that z1≠V1 ∧ z1≠V2. Then by the definition of 
H it follows that z1=acc h∩z1, whence z1=acc (h∩x)∩z1. Since z1 was arbitrary, we 
can generalize to get ∀y(y∈h∩x→ (y=V1 ∨ y=V2 → y=accum (h∩x)∩y) ∧ (y≠V1 ∧ 
y≠V2 → y=acc (h∩x)∩y)). Hence H(h∩x) by the definition of H.  
4 Since E!h∩x, H(h∩x), and x=acc h∩x, it follows that Vx by the definition of V. 
 
 
 THEOREM 6.    ∈ is well-founded on any history  Let x⊆h. Then ∃y(y∈x ∧ x∩y≡O). 
 
In English: any subset of a history has a member whose intersection with that subset 
is zilch. 
 
 In the proof we need to deal with two cases separately. When the history is V1 by 
itself, we argue that every member of h, and so every member of any subset x of h, is 
an ur-element and so does not have any members. It trivially follows that x has some 
member with which it shares no members. When h≠V1, on the other hand, we assume 
for the sake of a reductio that h has a subset x that misbehaves, i.e. every member of x 
shares a member with x. Then we show that there is a set b consisting precisely of the 
common members of the members of x. A contradiction follows.  
 It is instructive to compare our proof with Potter’s proof of the corresponding 
theorem (3.6.4) in his [21]. He avoids the need to proceed by cases, since for him a 
history is always a set of levels. So instead of h=V1, he has h={V1}, which can be 
dealt with alongside the other possibilities for h. In broad outline, his reductio 
resembles ours, but the details are quite different. As we shall explain, the principal 
	  
differences can be traced to Potter’s adoption of unrestricted separation from levels, 
which allows for empty and singleton sets, unlike the restricted version embodied in 
our axiom 2(iii).  
 Potter first uses unrestricted separation from levels to show that the set b exists. He 
argues that that there is a level to which the common members of the members of x all 
belong, since any member of h and therefore any member of its subset x is a level.  
 But we have only the restricted version of separation from levels to work with and 
so we need in addition to show there are many common members of the members of 
x. Here we employ axiom 2(ii) for the first time to infer the existence of many ur-
elements from x’s being a set. Since every member of x is a level, and every ur-
element is a member of every level, it follows that each of the many ur-elements is a 
member of every member of x.  
 The second difference between our proof and Potter’s turns on the nature of the 
ensuing contradiction. Potter shows that that the set b has each of its subsets as a 
member, contrary to his proposition (3.6.1) which implies that every set has a subset 
not among its members. But his proof of (3.6.1) makes essential use of unrestricted 
separation from levels, which is not available to us. Hence we follow a different route. 
We show more specifically that b∈b, contrary to axiom 1(iii). In fact, the same axiom 
is needed in order to show that b∈b. For at a crucial point (see step 12 of the proof of 
the second case below), we need to infer w∈h∩v from w∈h ∧ w∈v, which relies on 
theorem 4(iii) and therefore on axiom 1(iii). 
 Our proof, then, depends on the two axioms 1(iii) and 2(ii), which do not appear in 
Potter’s list. We shall see more of these axioms in subsequent proofs. Potter would, of 
course, count axiom 2(ii) as false, since he thinks that even when there are no ur-
elements, there are still the so-called pure sets. On the other hand, he seems to think 
axiom 1(iii) is true. Certainly, he derives the proposition that no set is a member of 
itself (3.7.3) even before he has reached foundation for sets. As to ur-elements, 
although he does not include an axiom forcing them to be memberless, he notes that 
‘this might be added for the sake of tidiness’ ([21], p. 30).  
 
 
 PROOF.   The hypothesis x⊆h entails Mx by the definition of ⊆, whence mzUz by 
lemma 3 and axiom 2(ii). Also from Mx it follows that V1={z:Uz} by lemma 7(iii), 
whence E!V1 by the strength of identity. We consider two cases separately: (i) h=V1 
and (ii) h≠V1. 
 
Case (i) h=V1 
Since by hypothesis x⊆h, it follows that y∈x→y∈h by the definition of ⊆. Hence 
y∈x→y∈V1, whence y∈x→Uy by lemma 4(i). Hence y∈x→¬∃z z∈y by the definition 
of U and axiom 1(iv). Since Mx, it follows by the definition of M that my y∈x, whence 
∃y y∈x. Hence ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y)), whence ∃y(y∈x ∧ x∩y≡O) by lemma 2(i) 
and the definition of ∩. 
 
Case (ii) h≠V1 
1 Since by hypothesis x⊆h, it follows that y∈x→y∈h, by the definition of ⊆. Since 
h≠V1, it follows by theorem 5 that y∈x→Vy. For a reductio suppose that ¬∃y(y∈x 
∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y), whence ∀y(y∈x→∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y)). Since Mx, it follows by the 
definition of M that my y∈x, whence ∃y y∈x. Consider an arbitrary level v such that 
v∈x. Then w∈x ∧ w∈v for some level w. By the same reasoning applied to w, it 
	  
follows from w∈x that w1∈x ∧ w1∈w for some level w1. And similarly w2∈x ∧ 
w2∈w1 for some level w2. Also since y∈x→y∈h, it follows that v∈h and w∈h. 
2 Let b be short for {z:∀y(y∈x→z∈y)}. We shall prove that (i) Mb, (ii) b⊆w, (iii) 
v=acc h∩v, (iv) E!h∩v, (v) mz(z∈h ∧ z∈v), and (vi) ∀y(y∈x→b∈y).  
3 For (i), with a view to using axiom 2(iii) we shall prove that (ia) mz ∀y(y∈x→z∈y) 
and (ib) ∃u∀z(∀y(y∈x→z∈y)→z∈u). 
4 For (ia), since y∈x→Vy (from step 1), and Vy→∀z(Uz→z∈y) by corollary (ii) of 
theorem 1, it follows that ∀z(Uz→∀y(y∈x→z∈y)). Since mzUz, it follows that 
  mz ∀y(y∈x→z∈y). 
5 For (ib), since v∈x, it follows that ∀z(∀y(y∈x→z∈y)→z∈v), whence 
∃u∀z(∀y(y∈x→z∈y)→z∈u). 
6 From (ia) and (ib), it follows that Mb by axiom 2(iii).  
7 For (ii), since w∈x, it follows that ∀z(∀y(y∈x→z∈y)→z∈w). Since Mb, it follows 
by lemma 3 that E!b, whence b={z:∀y(y∈x→z∈y)}. Hence by lemma 4(i), 
z∈b↔∀y(y∈x→z∈y), whence ∀z(z∈b→z∈w). Hence b⊆w by the definition of ⊆. 
8 For (iii), (iv) and (v), we shall first prove (iiia) v≠V1 and (iiib) v≠V2. 
9 For (iiia), for a reductio suppose that v=V1={z:Uz}. Since w∈v, it follows by 
lemma 4(i) that Uw. But by corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mw, whence by the 
definition of U, ¬Uw. Contradiction. Hence v≠V1. 
10 For (iiib), for a reductio suppose that v=V2. Then v={z:Uz ∨ z⊆V1} by lemma 7(iv). 
Since w∈v, it follows by lemma 4(i) that Uw ∨ w⊆V1. Since ¬Uw it follows that 
w⊆V1, whence w1∈V1 by the definition of ⊆, whence Uw1 by lemma 4(i). But by 
corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mw1, whence ¬Uw1 by the definition of U. 
Contradiction. Hence v≠V2.  
11 Since h≠V1 and v∈h and v≠V1 and v≠V2, it follows by theorems 4(i), (ii), and (iii) 
that v=acc h∩v and E!h∩v and mz(z∈h ∧ z∈v). 
12 For (vi), since E!h∩v, it follows that h∩v=[z: z∈h ∧ z∈v] by the definition of ∩. 
Since mz(z∈h ∧ z∈v) and w∈h ∧ w∈v, it follows by lemma 4(ii) that w∈h∩v. By 
the definition of acc, v=acc h∩v={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h∩v ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. Since 
w∈h∩v and b⊆w, it follows by lemma 4(i) that b∈acc h∩v, whence b∈v. Since 
b∈v for arbitrary v∈x, we can generalize to get ∀y(y∈x→b∈y). 
13 We can now proceed to the reductio initiated in step 1. Since ∀y(y∈x→z∈y)→z∈b 
then in particular ∀y(y∈x→b∈y)→b∈b. Since ∀y(y∈x→b∈y), it follows that b∈b, 
contrary to axiom 1(iii). Hence ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y), whence ∃y(y∈x ∧ 
x∩y≡O) by lemma 2(i) and the definition of ∩. 
 
 
 THEOREM 7.  Levels are transitive sets Let x∈y and y∈v. Then x∈v. 
 
In particular, membership between levels is transitive. It also follows that if a set is a 
member of a level, it is a member of all higher levels. The corollary tells us that it is a 
subset of all those levels too, the original included. 
 
 PROOF.   From the hypothesis x∈y it follows that My by lemma 5(i), whence by the 
definition of U, ¬Uy. Since My it follows that V1={z:Uz} by lemma 7(iii). From the 
hypothesis y∈v it follows that E!v by axiom 1(i). We tackle three cases separately:  
(i) v=V1, (ii) v=V2 and (iii) v≠V1 and v≠V2. 
 
	  
Case (i) v=V1 
From the hypothesis y∈v it follows by lemma 4(i) that Uy. But also ¬Uy. Hence x∈v 
by the tautology A∧¬A→B. 
 
Case (ii) v=V2 
By the strength of identity, E!V2. Since y∈v, it follows by lemma 7(v) that Uy ∨ y⊆V1. 
Since ¬Uy, it follows that y⊆V1. Since x∈y, it follows that x∈V1 by the definition of 
⊆. Hence Ux by lemma 4(i). Hence x∈V2 by lemma 7(v), whence x∈v. 
 
Case (iii) v≠V1 and v≠V2. 
1 By the definition of V, v=acc h for some history h. For a reductio suppose that 
h=V1. Then v=acc V1=V1 by lemma 7(i). Contradiction. Hence h≠V1, whence by the 
definition of acc, theorem 5 and lemma 1(i), v={z:(Uz ∨ ∃u(u∈h ∧ (z∈u ∨ z⊆u)))}. 
Since y∈v, it follows by lemma 4(i) that Uy ∨ ∃u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)). Since ¬Uy, 
it follows that y∈w ∨ y⊆w for some w∈h. We tackle three cases separately:  
 (a) w=V1, (b) w=V2, and (c) w≠V1 and w≠V2.  
2 For case (a), for a reductio suppose y∈w. Then y∈V1, whence by lemma 4(i), Uy. 
Contradiction. Hence y⊆w. Since x∈y, it follows by the definition of ⊆ that x∈w. 
Since v={z:(Uz ∨ ∃u(u∈h ∧ (z∈u ∨ z⊆u)))}, it follows by lemma 4(i) that x∈v.  
3 For case (b), suppose y∈w. Then y∈V2, whence Uy ∨ y⊆V1 by the strength of 
identity and lemma 7(v). Since ¬Uy, it follows that y⊆V1. Since x∈y, it follows by 
the definition of ⊆ that x∈V1, whence Ux by lemma 4(i). Hence by corollary (ii) of 
theorem 1, x∈v. Suppose instead that y⊆w. Since x∈y, it follows by the definition 
of ⊆ that x∈w, whence x∈v by lemma 4(i). 
4 For case (c), we deal with two subcases separately: (ci) ∃1u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)), 
and (cii) mu(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)). 
5 For case (ci), u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u) for some unique level u, namely w. Since h≠V1, 
w∈h, w≠V1 and w≠V2, it follows that w=acc h∩w, E!h∩w, and mz(z∈h ∧ z∈w) by 
theorems 4(i), (ii), and (iii). Hence by the definition of acc, w={z:(Uz ∨ 
∃z1(z1∈h∩w ∧ (z∈z1 ∨ z⊆z1)))}. For a reductio suppose y∈w. Then by lemma 4(i), 
Uy ∨ ∃z1(z1∈h∩w ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1))). Since My, it follows that ∃z1(z1∈ h∩w ∧ 
(y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1)) by the definition of U. Since E!h∩w, it follows that h∩w=h∩w. 
Since mz(z∈h ∧ z∈w), it follows by the definition of h∩w and lemma 4(ii) that for 
some z1, z1∈h	  ∧	  z1∈w ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1). Since z1∈h and h≠V1, it follows by theorem 
5 that Vz1. Since z1∈w, it follows by axiom 1(iii) that z1≠w. But z1∈h	  ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ 
y⊆z1) and Vz1 and z1≠w are together contrary to ∃1u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)). Hence 
y⊆w. Since x∈y, it follows by the definition of ⊆ that x∈w, and so by lemma 4(i) 
x∈v. 
6 For case (cii), let b be short for {u: u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)}. Since v=acc h, it follows 
by theorem 2(i) that z∈h→z∈v. Hence ∀u((u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u))→u∈v), whence 
∃v1∀u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u))→u∈v1). This together with mu(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)) 
entails Mb by axiom 2(iii). Hence by lemma 3 E!b, whence b={u: u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ 
y⊆u))}. Hence by lemma 4(i), z∈b→z∈h, whence by the definition of ⊆, b⊆h. 
Hence by theorem 6, ¬∃z2(z2∈b ∧ z2∈z1) for some z1∈b. Hence by lemma 4(i), 
z1∈h ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1). We deal with three subcases separately: (ciiα) z1=V1, (ciiβ) 
z1=V2, and (ciiγ) z1≠V1 ∧ z1≠V2.  
7 In case (ciiα), it follows that x∈v by the reasoning in step 2. 
	  
8 In case (ciiβ), it follows that x∈v by the reasoning in step 3. 
9 In case (ciiγ), since h≠V1, z1∈h, z1≠V1 and z1≠V2, it follows that z1=acc h∩z1, 
E!h∩z1 and mz(z∈h ∧ z∈z1) by theorems 4(i), (ii), and (iii). For a reductio suppose 
y∈z1. Then y∈acc h∩z1, whence by the definition of acc, y∈{z:(Uz ∨ ∃z3(z3∈h∩z1 
∧ (z∈z3 ∨ z⊆z3)))}. Since ¬Uy, it follows by lemma 4(i) that y∈z3 ∨ y⊆z3 for some 
z3∈h∩z1. Since E!h∩z1, it follows that h∩z1=h∩z1, whence by the definition of ∩ 
and lemma 4(ii), z3∈h ∧ z3∈z1. Since h≠V1 and z3∈h, it follows by theorem 5 that 
Vz3. Since Vz3 and z3∈h ∧ (y∈z3 ∨ y⊆z3), it follows by lemma 4(i) that z3∈b. But 
z3∈b and z3∈z1 are together contrary to ¬∃z2(z2∈b ∧ z2∈z1). Hence y∉z1, whence 
y⊆z1. Since x∈y, it follows by the definition of ⊆ that x∈z1, whence x∈v by lemma 
4(i).  
 
 COROLLARY.   Let My and y∈v. Then y⊆v. 
 
 PROOF.   Since y∈v, it follows that x∈y→x∈v by theorem 7, which together with 
My entails y⊆v by the definition of ⊆. 
 
 
 THEOREM 8.   Levels are hereditary sets  Let x⊆y and y∈v. Then x∈v. 
 
For this sense of ‘hereditary set’, see Tarski [26], p. 177. In particular, if a set is a 
subset of a level, it is a member of all higher levels. The proof of theorem 8 differs 
from the proof of theorem 7 in half a dozen places, but to help the reader we give it in 
full.  
 
 PROOF.   From the hypothesis x⊆y it follows that My by lemma 6(i), whence by the 
definition of U, ¬Uy. Since My it follows that V1={z:Uz} by lemma 7(iii). From the 
hypothesis y∈v it follows that E!v by axiom 1(i). We tackle three cases separately:  
(i) v=V1, (ii) v=V2 and (iii) v≠V1 and v≠V2. 
 
Case (i) v=V1 
From the hypothesis y∈v it follows by lemma 4(i) that Uy. But also ¬Uy. Hence x∈v 
by the tautology A∧¬A→B. 
 
Case (ii) v=V2 
By the strength of identity, E!V2. Since y∈v, it follows by lemma 7(v) that Uy ∨ y⊆V1. 
Since ¬Uy, it follows that y⊆V1. Since x⊆y, it follows that x⊆V1 by the definition of 
⊆. Hence x∈V2 by lemma 7(v), whence x∈v. 
 
Case (iii) v≠V1 and v≠V2. 
1 By the definition of V, v=acc h for some history h. For a reductio suppose that 
h=V1. Then v=acc V1=V1 by lemma 7(i). Contradiction. Hence h≠V1, whence by the 
definition of acc, theorem 5 and lemma 1(i), v={z:(Uz ∨ ∃u(u∈h ∧ (z∈u ∨ z⊆u)))}. 
Since y∈v, it follows by lemma 4(i) that Uy ∨ ∃u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)). Since ¬Uy, 
it follows that y∈w ∨ y⊆w for some w∈h. We tackle three cases separately:  
 (a) w=V1, (b) w=V2, and (c) w≠V1 and w≠V2.  
	  
2 For case (a), for a reductio suppose y∈w. Then y∈V1, whence by lemma 4(i), Uy. 
Contradiction. Hence y⊆w. Since x⊆y, it follows by the definition of ⊆ that x⊆w. 
Since v={z:(Uz ∨ ∃u(u∈h ∧ (z∈u ∨ z⊆u)))}, it follows by lemma 4(i) that x∈v.  
3 For case (b), suppose y∈w. Then y∈V2, whence Uy ∨ y⊆V1 by the strength of 
identity and lemma 7(v). Since ¬Uy, it follows that y⊆V1. Since x⊆y, it follows by 
the definition of ⊆ that x⊆V1. Hence by lemma 7(v), x∈V2, whence x∈w. So by 
lemma 4(i) x∈v. Suppose instead that y⊆w. Since x⊆y, it follows by the definition 
of ⊆ that x⊆w, whence x∈v by lemma 4(i). 
4 For case (c), we deal with two subcases separately: (ci) ∃1u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)), 
and (cii) mu(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)). 
5 For case (ci), u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u) for some unique level u, namely w. Since h≠V1, 
w∈h, w≠V1 and w≠V2, it follows that w=acc h∩w, E!h∩w, and mz(z∈h ∧ z∈w) by 
theorems 4(i), (ii), and (iii). Hence by the definition of acc, w={z:(Uz ∨ 
∃z1(z1∈h∩w ∧ (z∈z1 ∨ z⊆z1)))}. For a reductio suppose y∈w. Then by lemma 4(i), 
Uy ∨ ∃z1(z1∈h∩w ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1))). Since My, it follows that ∃z1(z1∈ h∩w ∧ 
(y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1)) by the definition of U. Since E!h∩w, it follows that h∩w=h∩w. 
Since mz(z∈h ∧ z∈w), it follows by the definition of h∩w and lemma 4(ii) that for 
some z1, z1∈h	  ∧	  z1∈w ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1). Since z1∈h and h≠V1, it follows by theorem 
5 that Vz1. Since z1∈w, it follows by axiom 1(iii) that z1≠w. But z1∈h	  ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ 
y⊆z1) and Vz1 and z1≠w are together contrary to ∃1u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)). Hence 
y⊆w. Since x⊆y, it follows by the definition of ⊆ that x⊆w, and so by lemma 4(i) 
x∈v. 
6 For case (cii), let b be short for {u: u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)}. Since v=acc h, it follows 
by theorem 2 that z∈h→z∈v. Hence ∀u((u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u))→u∈v), whence 
∃v1∀u(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u))→u∈v1). This together with mu(u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ y⊆u)) 
entails Mb by axiom 2(iii). Hence by lemma 3 E!b, whence b={u: u∈h ∧ (y∈u ∨ 
y⊆u))}. Hence by lemma 4(i), z∈b→z∈h, whence by the definition of ⊆, b⊆h. 
Hence by theorem 6, ¬∃z2(z2∈b ∧ z2∈z1) for some z1∈b. Hence by lemma 4(i), 
z1∈h ∧ (y∈z1 ∨ y⊆z1). We deal with three subcases separately: (ciiα) z1=V1, (ciiβ) 
z1=V2, and (ciiγ) z1≠V1 ∧ z1≠V2.  
7 In case (ciiα), it follows that x∈v by the reasoning in step 2. 
8 In case (ciiβ), it follows that x∈v by the reasoning in step 3. 
9 In case (ciiγ), since h≠V1, z1∈h, z1≠V1 and z1≠V2, it follows that z1=acc h∩z1, 
E!h∩z1 and mz(z∈h ∧ z∈z1) by theorems 4(i), (ii), and (iii). For a reductio suppose 
y∈z1. Then y∈acc h∩z1, whence by the definition of acc, y∈{z:(Uz ∨ ∃z3(z3∈h∩z1 
∧ (z∈z3 ∨ z⊆z3)))}. Since ¬Uy, it follows by lemma 4(i) that y∈z3 ∨ y⊆z3 for some 
z3∈h∩z1. Since E!h∩z1, it follows that h∩z1=h∩z1, whence by the definition of ∩ 
and lemma 4(ii), z3∈h ∧ z3∈z1. Since h≠V1 and z3∈h, it follows by theorem 5 that 
Vz3. Since Vz3 and z3∈h ∧ (y∈z3 ∨ y⊆z3), it follows by lemma 4(i) that z3∈b. But 
z3∈b and z3∈z1 are together contrary to ¬∃z2(z2∈b ∧ z2∈z1). Hence y∉z1, whence 
y⊆z1. Since x⊆y, it follows by the definition of ⊆ that x⊆z1, whence x∈v by lemma 
4(i). 
 
 
  
	  
 THEOREM 9.  Lower levels I	  
 (i)  ¬∃w w∈V1 and [w:w∈V1]≡O 
 (ii)  Let E!V2. Then ∃1w w∈V2 and [w:w∈V2]=  ℩w(w∈V2)=V1. 
 (iii)  Let E!v and v≠V1 and v≠V2. Then mw w∈v and [w:w∈v]={w:w∈v}. 
 
The parts cover the three cases for the number of lower levels: (i) V1 has none; (ii) V2 
has V1 as its sole lower level; (iii) any other level has many lower levels. Modified set 
abstraction is used to express each case as an identity.  
 
 PROOF OF (i).   For a reductio suppose that w∈V1 for some level w. Then by 
corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mw, and by axiom 1(i), E!V1. Hence by lemma 7(ii), Uw, 
whence ¬Mw by the definition of U. Contradiction. Hence ¬∃w w∈V1, whence by 
lemma 2(i), [w:w∈V1]≡O.   
 
 PROOF OF (ii). 
1 It follows from the hypothesis E!V2 that V2={z:Uz ∨ z⊆V1} by lemma 7(iv), and 
that E!V1 by lemma 7(vi). Hence by lemma 7(i), V1={z:Uz}. By lemma 7(vii), 
V1∈V2, and by the definition of V, V(V1). 
2 For a reductio suppose w≠V1 ∧ w∈V2 for some level w. Then by axiom 1(iii), 
w≠V2. Also by lemma 4(i), Uw ∨ w⊆V1. Since Vw, it follows by corollary (i) of 
theorem 1 that Mw, whence by the definition of U, ¬Uw. Hence w⊆V1. Since 
w≠V1, it follows by the definition of ⊂ that w⊂V1, whence w⊂{z:Uz}. Hence by 
lemma 6(iii), x∉w ∧	  x∈{z:Uz} for some x, whence by lemma 4(i), x∉w ∧ Ux, 
contrary to corollary (ii) of theorem 1. Hence ¬∃w(w≠V1 ∧ w∈V2). 
3 Since V(V1) and V1∈V2 and ¬∃w(w≠V1 ∧ w∈V2), it follows that ∃1w w∈V2 and ℩w(w∈V2)=V1, whence [w:w∈V2]= ℩w(w∈V2)=V1 by lemma 2(ii). 
 
 PROOF OF (iii).  
1 Since by hypothesis E!v and v≠V1 and v≠V2, it follows by the definition of V that 
v=acc h for some history h. By the definition of acc, v=acc h={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ 
(z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. Hence by lemma 4(i), z∈v↔(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). 
2 By theorem 2(ii), Mh ∧ h≠V1. Hence my y∈h by the definition of M, whence 
my(y∈h ∧ Vy) by theorem 5, and so mw w∈h. Consider an arbitrary level u∈h. By 
corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mu. Hence by lemma 6(ii), u⊆u, whence u∈v by 
z∈v↔(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). Hence mw w∈v, whence by lemma 2(iii), 
[w:w∈v]≡{w:w∈v}. Since ∀w(w∈v→w∈v), by existential generalization 
∃v1∀w(w∈v→w∈v1). Hence by axiom 2(iii), M{w:w∈v}, whence E!{w:w∈v} by 
lemma 3. Hence [w:w∈v]={w:w∈v}. 
 
 
 THEOREM 10.  Lower levels II 
 (i) Let v=V1 or v=V2. Then v=accum [w:w∈v]. 
 (ii) Let E!v and v≠V1 and v≠V2. Then v=acc [w:w∈v]. 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   Suppose v=V1. Then by theorem 9(i) [w:w∈v]≡O, whence v=accum 
[w:w∈v] by the definition of V1. Suppose instead that v=V2. Then E!V2 by the strength 
of identity, whence by theorem 9(ii) [w:w∈v]=V1. Hence v=accum [w:w∈v] by the 
definition of V2. 
	  
 
 PROOF OF (ii).    
1 Since by hypothesis E!v and v≠V1 and v≠V2, it follows that [w:w∈v]={w:w∈v} by 
theorem 9(iii), whence by lemma 4(i) y∈{w:w∈v}↔(y∈v ∧ Vy). It also follows 
from the hypothesis by the definition of V that v=acc h for some history h. By the 
definition of acc, v=acc h={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. Hence by lemma 
4(i), z∈v↔(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). 
2 We shall prove that acc {w:w∈v}={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. With 
a view to using axiom 2(iii), we first prove (a) mz(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ 
z⊆y))) and (b) ∃u∀z((Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))→z∈u).  
3 For (a), by hypothesis E!v. Hence Mv by corollary (i) of theorem 1, whence ∃xMx. 
Hence mzUz by axiom 2(ii), a fortiori mz(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). 
4 For (b), consider an arbitrary z such that Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)). We 
consider the three possibilities for z and deduce z∈v in each case. First, suppose 
Uz. Then by corollary (ii) of theorem 1, z∈v. Second, suppose z∈y for some 
y∈{w:w∈v}. Then y∈v, whence z∈v by theorem 7. Third, suppose z⊆y for some 
y∈{w:w∈v}. Then y∈v, whence z∈v by theorem 8. Since z was arbitrary, we can 
generalize to get ∀z((Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))→z∈v), whence 
∃u∀z((Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))→z∈u). 
5 From (a) and (b) it follows that M{z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))} by 
axiom 2(iii), whence by the definition of acc and lemma 3, acc {w:w∈v}={z:(Uz ∨ 
∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. 
6 By lemma 4(i), M(acc {w:w∈v}) and z∈acc {w:w∈v}↔(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ 
(z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). We shall prove z∈v↔z∈acc {w:w∈v}.  
7 For the → half, suppose z∈v. Then Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)). By theorems 2(i) 
and (ii), and 5, y∈h→(y∈v ∧ Vy). Hence y∈h→y∈{w:w∈v}, whence Uz ∨ 
∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)). Hence z∈acc {w:w∈v}. 
8 For the ← half, suppose z∈acc {w:w∈v}. Then Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈v} ∧ (z∈y ∨ 
z⊆y)). By the reasoning in step 4, it follows that z∈v for each of the three 
possibilities for z.  
9 Since Mv and M(acc {w:w∈v}) and z∈v↔z∈acc {w:w∈v}, then by axiom 1(ii), 
v=acc {w:w∈v}, whence v=acc [w:w∈v]. 
 
 
 THEOREM 11.  Lower levels III  H[w:w∈v] 
 
Theorems 10 and 11 together ensure that any level v has [w:w∈v] as a history. 
 
 PROOF.  
By corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mv, whence E!v by lemma 3. It also follows from Mv 
by lemma 7(iii) that V1={z:Uz}, whence MV1 by lemma 4(i). We tackle three cases 
separately: (i) v=V1, (ii) v=V2, and (iii) v≠V1 and v≠V2.  
 
Case (i) v=V1 
By theorem 9(i), [w:w∈v]≡O. Since ¬E!O, it follows by lemma 3 and axiom 1(iv) that 
¬∃x x∈O. Hence H[w:w∈v] by the definition of H. 
 
  
	  
Case (ii) v=V2 
By theorem 9(ii), [w:w∈v]=V1, which together with MV1 entails H[w:w∈v] by the 
definition of H. 
 
Case (iii) v≠V1 and v≠V2.  
1 By theorem 9(iii), mw w∈v and [w:w∈v]={w:w∈v}, whence by lemma 4(i), 
M[w:w∈v] and mw1 w1∈[w:w∈v]. Consider an arbitrary level u∈[w:w∈v].We shall 
prove that (a) u=V1 ∨ u=V2 →	  u=accum [w:w∈v]∩u, and (b) u≠V1 ∧ u≠V2 →  
u=acc [w:w∈v]∩u. 
2 For (a), we prove: (ai) u=V1 →	  u=accum [w:w∈v]∩u, and (aii) u=V2 →	  u=accum 
[w:w∈v]∩u, 
3 For (ai), suppose u=V1. Then u=accum O by the definition of V1. By lemma 4(i), 
corollary (i) of theorem 1 and the definition of U, w1∈{w:w∈v}→ ¬Uw1. Also by 
lemma 4(i), w1∈u→Uw1. Hence ¬∃w1(w1∈{w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u), whence by lemma 
2(i), [w1: w1∈{w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u]≡O. Hence {w:w∈v}∩u≡O by the definition of ∩. 
Hence u=accum {w:w∈v}∩u, whence u=accum [w:w∈v]∩u. 4  For (aii): suppose u=V2. Then u=accum V1 by the definition of V2. Since E!v and 
v≠V1 and v≠V2, it follows by the definition of V that v=acc h for some history h. By 
theorem 2(ii) Mh ∧ h≠V1, whence my y∈h by the definition of M. Hence w1∈h for 
some level w1 by theorem 5. By corollary (ii) of theorem 1, Uz→z∈w1, whence by 
lemma 4(i), z∈V1→z∈w1. Since MV1, it follows that V1⊆w1 by the definition of ⊆. 
By the definition of acc and lemma 4(i), z∈v↔(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). 
Hence V1∈v, whence V1∈{w:w∈v} by lemma 4(i) and the definition of V. Since by 
hypothesis u=V2, it follows by the strength of identity that E!V2. Hence 
V1=  ℩w(w∈u) by theorem 9(ii). Since V1∈{w:w∈v}, it follows that V1=  ℩w1(w1∈	  	   {w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u). Hence by the strength of identity, E!℩w1(w1∈{w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u), 
whence ∃1w1(w1∈{w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u). Hence {w:w∈v}∩u=V1 by lemma 2(ii) and 
the definition of ∩.	  Hence u=accum {w:w∈v}∩u, whence u=accum [w:w∈v]∩u. 
5  From (ai) and (aii) it follows that u=V1 ∨ u=V2 →	  u=accum [w:w∈v]∩u. 
6 For (b), suppose u≠V1 ∧ u≠V2. Since u∈{w:w∈v}, it follows by lemma 4(i) that 
u∈v. Hence by theorem 7, w1∈u→w1∈v, whence (w1∈v ∧ w1∈u)↔w1∈u. Hence 
by lemma 4(i), (w1∈{w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u)↔w1∈u, whence by lemma 1(ii),  
 [w1: w1∈{w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u]≡[w1:w1∈u].  Since E!u and u≠V1 and u≠V2, it follows 
by theorem 9(iii) that [w1:w1∈u]={w1:w1∈u}, whence E![w1:w1∈u] by the strength 
of identity. Hence [w1: w1∈{w:w∈v} ∧ w1∈u]=[w1:w1∈u], whence {w:w∈v}∩u = 
[w1:w1∈u] by the definition of ∩. By theorem 10(ii), u=acc [w1:w1∈u]. Hence 
u=acc{w:w∈v}∩u, whence u=acc [w:w∈v]∩u. 
7 (a) and (b) hold for arbitrary u∈[w:w∈v]. Since [w:w∈v]={w:w∈v}, it follows by 
lemma 4(i) that y∈{w:w∈v}→Vy. So we can generalize to get ∀y(y∈[w:w∈v]→ 
(y=V1 ∨ y=V2 → y=accum [w:w∈v]∩y) ∧ (y≠V1 ∧ y≠V2 → y=acc [w:w∈v]∩y)), 
which together with M[w:w∈v] entails H[w:w∈v] by the definition of H. 
 
 
  
  
	  
THEOREM 12.  Foundation for levels  
 Let ∃uA(u). Then ∃v(A(v) ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ A(w))). 
 
In English: let some level satisfy a condition; then there is a lowest level satisfying the 
condition. 
 
 PROOF.   By hypothesis A(u) for some level u. We tackle three cases separately: (i) 
¬∃w(w∈u ∧ A(w)), (ii) ∃1w(w∈u ∧ A(w)), and (iii) mw(w∈u ∧ A(w)). 
 
Case (i) ¬∃w(w∈u ∧ A(w)) 
It follows immediately that ∃v(A(v) ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ A(w))). 
 
Case (ii) ∃1w(w∈u ∧ A(w)) 
By hypothesis w1∈u ∧ A(w1) for some unique level w1. For a reductio suppose that 
w2∈w1 and A(w2) for some level w2. Since w2∈w1 and w1∈u, it follows by theorem 7 
that w2∈u. Since w2∈w1, it follows by axiom 1(iii) that w2≠w1. But w1∈u, A(w1), 
w2∈u, A(w2), and w2≠w1 are together contrary to ∃1w(w∈u ∧ A(w)). Hence A(w1) ∧ 
¬∃w(w∈w1 ∧ A(w)), whence  ∃v(A(v) ∧¬∃w(w∈v ∧ A(w))). 
 
Case (iii) mw(w∈u ∧ A(w)) 
1 Since mw(w∈u ∧ A(w)) and ∀w((w∈u ∧ A(w))→w∈u), it follows by axiom 2(iii) 
that M{w:w∈u ∧ A(w)}. Hence by lemma 3, E!{w:w∈u ∧ A(w)}, whence {w:w∈u 
∧ A(w)}={w:w∈u ∧ A(w)}. Hence by lemma 4(i), w1∈{w:w∈u ∧ A(w)} ↔ (w1∈u 
∧ A(w1)).  
2  Since mw(w∈u ∧ A(w)), it follows that mw w∈u, which together with  
∀w(w∈u→w∈u) entails M{w:w∈u} by axiom 2(iii). Hence by lemma 3, 
E!{w:w∈u}, whence {w:w∈u}={w:w∈u}. Hence by lemma 4(i), w1∈{w:w∈u} ↔ 
w1∈u. 
3  Since M{w:w∈u ∧ A(w)} and (w1∈u ∧ A(w1))→w1∈u, it follows that {w:w∈u ∧ 
A(w)}⊆{w:w∈u} by the definition of ⊆.  
4  Since mw w∈u, it follows by theorems 9(i) and (ii) that u≠V1 and u≠V2, whence by 
theorem 9(iii), [w:w∈u]={w:w∈u}. Hence by theorem 11, H{w:w∈u}. 
5  Since {w:w∈u ∧ A(w)}⊆{w:w∈u} and H{w:w∈u}, it follows by theorem 6 that for 
some level w2, w2∈{w: w∈u ∧ A(w)} ∧ ¬∃z(z∈{w: w∈u ∧ A(w)}∧ z∈w2), whence 
w2∈u ∧ A(w2). 
6. For a reductio suppose that w3∈w2 and A(w3) for some level w3. Since w3∈w2 and 
w2∈u, it follows by theorem 7 that w3∈u. Since w3∈u and A(w3), it follows that 
w3∈{w:w∈u ∧ A(w)}. But w3∈{w:w∈u ∧ A(w)} and w3∈w2 are together contrary 
to ¬∃z(z∈{w: w∈u ∧ A(w)}∧ z∈w2). Hence A(w2) ∧ ¬∃w(w∈w2 ∧ A(w)), whence 
∃v(A(v) ∧¬∃w(w∈v ∧ A(w))). 
 
 
 THEOREM 13.  Comparability of levels  v∈w ∨ v=w ∨ w∈v 
 
 PROOF.  
1 For a reductio suppose for some v, ∃w(v∉w ∧ v≠w ∧ w∉v). Then for some v1, 
∃w(v1∉w ∧ v1≠w ∧ w∉v1) ∧ ¬∃v2(v2∈v1 ∧ ∃w(v2∉w ∧ v2≠w ∧ w∉v2)) by theorem 
12. Hence ∀v2(v2∈v1→∀w(v2∈w ∨ v2=w ∨ w∈v2)). 
	  
2  Since for some w, (v1∉w ∧ v1≠w ∧ w∉v1), it follows by theorem 12 that for some 
w1, (v1∉w1 ∧ v1≠w1 ∧ w1∉v1) ∧ ¬∃w2(w2∈w1 ∧ (v1∉w2 ∧ v1≠w2 ∧ w2∉v1)). Hence 
∀w2(w2∈w1→(v1∈w2 ∨ v1=w2 ∨ w2∈v1)). We shall prove ∀w3(w3∈v1↔w3∈w1). 
3  For the → half, suppose w3∈v1. Since w1∉v1, then w3≠w1. For a reductio suppose 
w1∈w3. Then from w3∈v1 it follows that w1∈v1 by theorem 7. Contradiction. Hence 
w1∉w3. Since ∀v2(v2∈v1→∀w(v2∈w ∨ v2=w ∨ w∈v2)) and w3∈v1 and w3≠w1 and 
w1∉w3, it follows that w3∈w1. 
4 For the ← half, suppose w3∈w1. Since v1∉w1, then w3≠v1. For a reductio suppose 
v1∈w3. Then from w3∈w1 it follows that v1∈w1 by theorem 7. Contradiction. Hence 
v1∉w3. Since ∀w2(w2∈w1→(v1∈w2 ∨ v1=w2 ∨ w2∈v1)) and w3∈w1 and w3≠v1 and 
v1∉w3, it follows that w3∈v1. 
5 Since ∀w3(w3∈v1↔w3∈w1), it follows by lemma 1(ii) that [w:w∈v1]≡[w:w∈w1]. 
We shall prove (a) v1≠V1 ∧ w1≠V1, and (ii) v1≠V2 ∧ w1≠V2. 
6 For (a), for a reductio suppose v1=V1. By theorem 9(i), [w:w∈v1]≡O, whence 
[w:w∈w1]≡O. By theorems 10(i) and (ii), w1=accum [w:w∈w1] or w1=acc 
[w:w∈w1], whence w1=accum O or w1=acc O. For a reductio suppose w1=accum O. 
Then w1=v1 by the definition of V1. Contradiction. Hence w1=acc O, whence w1=v1 
by lemma 7(i). Contradiction. Hence v1≠V1. By similar reasoning, w1≠V1. 
7 For (b), for a reductio suppose v1=V2. Then E!V2 by the strength of identity, 
whence V1∈v1 by lemma 7(vii), and also [w:w∈v1]=  ℩w(w∈v1)=V1 by theorem 9(ii). 
Since ∀w3(w3∈v1↔w3∈w1), it follows that V1∈w1. By theorems 10(i) and (ii), 
w1=accum [w:w∈w1] or w1=acc [w:w∈w1]. Since [w:w∈v1]≡[w:w∈w1], it follows 
that w1=accum V1 or w1=acc V1. For a reductio suppose w1=accum V1. Then w1=v1 
by the definition of V2. Contradiction. Hence w1=acc V1. Then w1=V1 by lemma 
7(i). But V1∈w1 and w1=V1 are together contrary to axiom 1(iii). Hence v1≠V2. By 
similar reasoning, w1≠V2. 
8 We can now proceed to the reductio initiated in step 1. From (a) and (b) it follows 
that v1=acc [w:w∈v1] and w1=acc [w:w∈w1] by theorem 10(ii). Since [w:w∈v1]≡ 
[w:w∈w1], it follows that v1=acc [w:w∈v1]=acc [w:w∈w1]=w1. Contradiction. 
Hence v∈w ∨ v=w ∨ w∈v. 	  	  	   THEOREM 14.  The lowest level principle  
 Let ∃uA(u). Then ∃1v(A(v) ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ A(w))). 
 
In English: let some level satisfy a condition; then there is a unique lowest level 
satisfying the condition. 
 
 PROOF.   Since by hypothesis ∃uA(u), it follows by theorem 12 that A(v) ∧ 
¬∃w(w∈v ∧ A(w)) for some level v. For a reductio suppose that A(v1) ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v1 ∧ 
A(w)) for some level v1≠v. Then by theorem 13 it follows that v∈v1 ∨ v1∈v. But if 
v∈v1 then v∈v1 ∧ A(v), contrary to ¬∃w(w∈v1 ∧ A(w)). Similarly, if v1∈v then v1∈v ∧ 
A(v1), contrary to ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ A(w)). Contradiction. Hence ∃1v(A(v) ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ 
A(w))). 
 
 
  
  
	  
THEOREM 15.  Uniqueness of histories 
(i) Let V1=accum h. Then h≡[w:w∈V1]. 
(ii) Let V2=accum h. Then h=[w:w∈V2]. 
(iii) Let v≠V1 and v≠V2 and v=acc h. Then h=[w:w∈v]. 
 
By theorems 10 and 11, any level v has [w:w∈v] as a history. This theorem ensures 
that v has no other history. 
 
 PROOF OF (i). 
1  Since by hypothesis V1=accum h, it follows that E!V1 by the strength of identity, 
whence z∈V1→Uz by lemma 7(ii).  
2 For a reductio suppose h≢[w:w∈V1]. Then h≢O by theorem 9(i), whence Mh by 
the definition of H. Hence h⊆h by lemma 6(ii). By the definition of accum, 
V1=accum h={z:Uz ∨ z∈h ∨ z⊆h}, whence h∈V1 by lemma 4(i). Hence Uh, 
whence ¬Mh by the definition of U. Contradiction. Hence h≡[w:w∈V1]. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii). 
1 Since by hypothesis V2=accum h, it follows that E!V2 by the strength of identity. 
By theorem 9(ii), [w:w∈V2]=V1, whence E!V1 by the strength of identity. Hence 
MV1 by lemma 7(ii).   
2 For a reductio suppose h≡O. Then by the definition of V1, V2 =	  accum h = accum O 
= V1, contrary to lemma 7(viii). Hence h≢O, whence Mh by the definition of H. 
Hence h⊆h by lemma 6(ii). By the definition of accum, V2=accum h={z:Uz ∨ z∈h 
∨ z⊆h}, whence h∈V2 by lemma 4(i). Hence by lemma 7(v), Uh ∨ h⊆V1. Since 
Mh, it follows that ¬Uh by the definition of U, whence h⊆V1. Hence z∈h→Uz by 
the definition of ⊆ and lemma 7(ii). 
3 For a reductio suppose h≠[w:w∈V2]. Then h≠V1, whence h⊂V1 by the definition of 
⊂. Hence for some z1, z1∉h ∧ z1∈V1 by lemma 6(iii). By lemma 7(vii) V1∈V2, 
whence UV1 ∨ V1∈h ∨ V1⊆h by lemma 4(i). Since MV1, it follows that ¬UV1 by 
the definition of U. Hence V1∈h ∨ V1⊆h. For a subordinate reductio suppose V1∈h. 
Then UV1, whence ¬MV1 by the definition of U. Contradiction. Hence V1⊆h, 
whence z∈V1→z∈h by the definition of ⊆. Contradiction. Hence h=[w:w∈V2]. 
 
 PROOF OF (iii). 
1 Since by hypothesis v≠V1 and v=acc h, it follows by theorem 2(ii) that Mh ∧ h≠V1, 
whence E!h by lemma 3. 
2 For a reductio suppose h≠{w:w∈v}. Then by theorem 14, there is a unique level v1 
such that for some history h1, v1≠V1 ∧ v1≠V2 ∧ v1=acc h1 ∧ h1≠{w:w∈v1}, and 
¬∃w1(w1∈v1 ∧ ∃x(Hx ∧ w1≠V1 ∧ w1≠V2 ∧ w1=acc x ∧ x≠{w:w∈w1}). Hence Mh1 ∧ 
h1≠V1 by theorem 2(ii). By the definition of acc, v1=acc h1={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h1 ∧ 
(z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}, whence by lemma 4(i), z∈v1↔(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h1 ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y))). We 
shall prove that w2∈h1↔w2∈v1. 
3 The → half is immediate by theorem 2(i). 
4 For the ← half, suppose w2∈v1. Then E!w2 by axiom 1(i). For a reductio suppose 
 w3∈h1→w3∈w2. We tackle three cases separately, deriving a contradiction for 
each: (i) w2=V1, (ii) w2=V2, and (iii) w2≠V1 and w2≠V2. 
	  
5 For case (i), since Mh1, it follows by the definition of M that x∈h1 for some x. 
Since h1≠V1, it follows by theorem 5 that Vx. By supposition w3∈h1→w3∈w2, 
whence x∈V1. But by theorem 9(i) ¬∃w w∈V1. Contradiction.  
6 For case (ii), since Mh1, it follows by the definition of M that x∈h1 and y∈h1, for 
some x, y where x≠y. Since h1≠V1, it follows by theorem 5 that Vx and Vy. By 
supposition w3∈h1→w3∈w2, and so x∈V2 and y∈V2. But by theorem 9(ii), ∃1w 
w∈V2. Contradiction. 
7 For case (iii), by theorems 9(iii) and 10(ii), w2=acc {w4:w4∈w2}, whence 
w2={z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w4:w4∈w2} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))} by the definition of acc. Hence 
z∈w2↔(Uz ∨ ∃w(w∈w2 ∧ (z∈w ∨ z⊆w))) by lemma 4(i). Since h1≠V1, it follows 
by theorem 5 that y∈h1→Vy. Since (from step 2) z∈v1→(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈h1 ∧ (z∈y ∨ 
z⊆y))) and (by supposition) w3∈h1→w3∈w2, it follows that z∈v1→(Uz ∨ ∃w(w∈w2 
∧ (z∈w ∨ z⊆w))), whence z∈v1→z∈w2. But w2∈v1, so w2∈w2, contrary to axiom 
1(iii).  
8 Since each case leads to a contradiction, it follows that w5∈h1 ∧ w5∉w2 for some 
w5, whence by theorem 13 w2=w5 ∨ w2∈w5. Suppose w2=w5. Since w5∈h1, it 
follows that w2∈h1.  
9 Taking the other alternative, suppose w2∈w5. We tackle three cases separately:  
 (a) w5=V1, (b) w5=V2 and (c) w5≠V1 and w5≠V2.  
10 For case (a), by theorem 9(i) ¬∃w w∈V1, whence w2∉w5. But also w2∈w5. By the 
tautology A∧¬A→B it follows that w2∈h1. 
11 For case (b), since w2∈w5, it follows that w2∈V2. Hence by theorem 9(ii), w2=V1. 
Since w5∈h1, it follows that V2∈h1. Since h1≠V1, it follows by the reasoning in steps 
1–5 of case (ii) of theorem 5 that V1∈h1, whence w2∈h1. 
12 For case (c), since h1≠V1 and w5∈h1 and w5≠V1 and w5≠V2, it follows by theorems 
4(i), (ii) and (iii), and 5 that w5=acc h1∩w5 and E!(h1∩w5) and mz(z∈h1 ∧ z∈w5) 
and H(h1∩w5). Since w5∈h1 and v1=acc h1, it follows by theorem 2(i) that w5∈v1. 
Hence ¬∃x(Hx ∧ w5≠V1 ∧ w5≠V2 ∧ w5=acc x ∧ x≠{w:w∈w5}) by step 2. Since 
E!(h1∩w5) and H(h1∩w5) and w5≠V1 and w5≠V2 and w5=acc h1∩w5, it follows that 
h1∩w5={w:w∈w5}. Since w2∈w5, it follows by lemma 4(i) that w2∈(h1∩w5). Since 
mz(z∈h1 ∧ z∈w5) it follows by the definition of ∩ and lemma 2(iii) that (h1∩w5)= 
{z: z∈h1 ∧ z∈w5}. Hence w2∈{z: z∈h1 ∧ z∈w5}, whence by lemma 4(i) w2∈h1. 
13 We can now proceed to the reductio initiated in step 2. Since E!v1 and v1≠V1 and 
v1≠V2, it follows by theorem 9(iii) that [w:w∈v1]={w:w∈v1}. Hence M{w:w∈v1} by 
lemma 4(i). Since w2∈h1↔w2∈v1, it follows that w2∈h1↔w2∈{w:w∈v1} by lemma 
4(i). Since h1≠V1, it follows by theorem 5 that x∈h1→Vx. Also x∈{w:w∈v1}→Vx 
by lemma 4(i). Hence x∈h1↔x∈{w:w∈v1}. Since Mh1 and M{w:w∈v1} and 
x∈h1↔x∈{w:w∈v1}, it follows by axiom 1(ii) that h1={w:w∈v1}. Contradiction. 
Hence h={w:w∈v}. Since v=acc h, it follows that E!v by the strength of identity, 
whence by theorem 9(iii) that h=[w:w∈v]. 
 
 
We define V*(a) to be the lowest level v such that a⊆v (for short, the level of a). In 
symbols, V*(a) =df   ℩v(a⊆v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ a⊆w)) 
 
 THEOREM 16.  Sets and levels I  Let Mx. Then   (i) ∃u x⊆u 
        (ii) E!V*(x). 
	  
 
 PROOF OF (i).   By lemma 5(ii), M{z:z∈x}. Hence by axiom 2(iii), 
∃u∀z(z∈x→z∈u), whence ∃u x⊆u by the definition of ⊆. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   By theorem 16(i), ∃u x⊆u. Hence by theorem 14, ∃1v(x⊆v ∧ 
¬∃w(w∈v ∧ x⊆w)), whence E!℩v(x⊆v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ x⊆w)). Hence E!V*(x) by the 
definition of V*(x). 
 
 THEOREM 17.  Foundation for sets Let Mx. Then ∃y(y∈x ∧ x∩y≡O). 
 
This is our version of the familiar foundation or regularity axiom, but for us it goes 
without saying that the set x is non-empty. 
 
 PROOF. 
1  Suppose Uy ∧ y∈x for some y. Then ¬My by the definition of U. So by axiom 1(iv) 
¬∃z z∈y. Hence ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y), whence x∩y≡O by lemma 2(i) and the definition 
of ∩. Hence ∃y(y∈x ∧ x∩y≡O). 
2  Suppose instead that z∈x→¬Uz. It follows by the definition of U and axiom 1(i) 
that z∈x→Mz. Since Mx then my y∈x by the definition of M, whence ∃y(My ∧ 
y∈x). Hence by theorem 16(ii), ∃y(E!V*(y) ∧ y∈x), whence ∃u∃y(u=V*(y) ∧ y∈x) 
by the definition of V*(y). Hence by theorem 14, there is a unique level v1 such that 
for some y, v1=V*(y) ∧ y∈x, and ¬∃w(w∈v1 ∧ ∃z(w=V*(z) ∧ z∈x)). 
3 For a reductio suppose that z1∈x ∧ z1∈y for some z1. Since z∈x→Mz, it follows 
that Mz1, whence E!V*(z1) by theorem 16(ii). Since y⊆V*(y) by the definition of 
V*(y), it follows by the definition of ⊆ that z1∈V*(y). We tackle three cases 
separately—(i) V*(y)=V1, (ii) V*(y)=V2 and (iii) V*(y)≠V1 and V*(y)≠V2—proving 
in each case that V*(z1)∈V*(y).  
4 In case (i), V*(y)=V1. Then E!V1 by the strength of identity, whence Uz1 by lemma 
7(ii). Hence by the definition of U, ¬Mz1. But also Mz1. Hence V*(z1)∈V*(y) by 
the tautology A∧¬A→B. 
5 In case (ii), V*(y)=V2. Hence E!V2 by the strength of identity, whence E!V1 by 
lemma 7(vi). Since z1∈V*(y), it follows by lemma 7(v) that Uz1 ∨ z1⊆V1. Since 
Mz1, it follows by the definition of U that z1⊆V1. By the definitions of V and  
V*(z1), V(V1) and V(V*(z1)), whence by theorem 13, V1∈V*(z1) ∨ V1=V*(z1) ∨ 
V*(z1)∈V1. By the definition of V*(z1), ¬∃w(w∈V*(z1) ∧ z1⊆w). Since V(V1) and 
z1⊆V1, it follows that V1∉V*(z1), whence V1=V*(z1) ∨ V*(z1)∈V1. For a reductio 
suppose V*(z1)∈V1. Then by lemma 7(ii) and the definition of U, ¬M(V*(z1)). But 
since V(V*(z1)), it follows by corollary (i) of theorem 1 that M(V*(z1)). 
Contradiction. Hence V1=V*(z1), whence V*(z1)∈V*(y) by lemma 7(vii).  
6 In case (iii), V*(y)≠V1 and V*(y)≠V2. It follows that [w:w∈V*(y)]={w:w∈V*(y)} by 
theorem 9(iii). Since z1∈V*(y), it follows that z1∈acc {w:w∈V*(y)} by theorem 
10(ii). By the definition of acc, acc {w:w∈V*(y)}={x:(Ux ∨ ∃y1(y1∈{w:w∈V*(y)} 
∧ (x∈y1 ∨ x⊆y1)))}, whence Uz1 ∨ ∃y1(y1∈{w:w∈V*(y)} ∧ (z1∈y1 ∨ z1⊆y1))) by 
lemma 4(i). Since Mz1, it follows that ¬Uz1 by the definition of U. Hence by 
lemma 4(i), z1∈v ∨ z1⊆v for some level v∈V*(y), whence z1⊆v by the corollary of 
theorem 7. By theorem 13, V*(z1)∈v ∨ V*(z1)=v  ∨ v∈V*(z1). By the definition of 
V*(z1), ¬∃w(w∈V*(z1) ∧ z1⊆w). Since z1⊆v, it follows that v∉V*(z1), whence 
V*(z1)∈v ∨ V*(z1)=v. Suppose V*(z1)∈v. Then from v∈V*(y), it follows that 
	  
V*(z1)∈V*(y) by theorem 7. Suppose V*(z1)=v. Then from v∈V*(y), it again 
follows that V*(z1)∈V*(y).  
7 We can now proceed to the reductio initiated in step 3. From V*(z1)∈V*(y) and 
V*(y)=v1 it follows that V*(z1)∈v1. But V*(z1)∈v1 and z1∈x are together contrary to 
¬∃w(w∈v1 ∧ ∃z(w=V*(z) ∧ z∈x)) by the definition of V*(z). Hence ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ 
z∈y), whence x∩y≡O by lemma 2(i) and the definition of ∩. Hence ∃y(y∈x ∧ 
x∩y≡O). 
We now turn to various operations, starting with a separation scheme, which follows 
Cantor’s requirement that the separated members are many. 
 
 THEOREM 18.  Cantorian Separation  
 Let Mx and my(y∈x ∧ A(y)). Then M{y:y∈x ∧ A(y)}. 
 
 PROOF.   By theorem 16(i), ∃u x⊆u, whence ∃u∀y(y∈x→y∈u) by the definition of 
⊆. Hence ∃u∀y((y∈x ∧ A(y))→y∈u), which together with my(y∈x ∧ A(y)) entails 
M{y:y∈x ∧ A(y)} by axiom 2(iii). 
 
 
 THEOREM 19.  Intersection  Let mz(z∈x ∧ z∈y). Then M(x∩y).  
 
 PROOF.   Since mz(z∈x ∧ z∈y), a fortiori mz z∈x, whence Mx by the definition of 
M. Hence by theorem 18, M{z: z∈x ∧ z∈y}, whence by lemma 3, E!{z: z∈x ∧ z∈y}. 
Hence by lemma 2(iii), [z: z∈x ∧ z∈y]={z: z∈x ∧ z∈y}, whence x∩y={z: z∈x ∧ z∈y} 
by the definition of ∩. Hence M(x∩y). 
 
 
We define the intersection of a set of sets a to be the thing that is either the sole 
common member of each member of a or the set of the common members of each 
member of a. In symbols, where Ma and ∀y(y∈a→My), ∩a =df  [z:∀y(y∈a→z∈y)].  
 
 THEOREM 20.  Generalized Intersection 
 Let Mx and ∀y(y∈x→My) and mz(∀y(y∈x→z∈y)). Then M(∩x). 
 
 PROOF.  
1 Since by hypothesis Mx, it follows that mz z∈x by the definition of M, whence 
z1∈x for some z1. Since by hypothesis ∀y(y∈x→My), it follows that Mz1. Since 
∀y(y∈x→z∈y)→z∈z1 and mz(∀y(y∈x→z∈y)), it follows that mz(z∈z1 ∧ 
∀y(y∈x→z∈y)). Hence by theorem 18, M{z: z∈z1 ∧ ∀y(y∈x→z∈y)}, whence by 
lemma 3, E!{z: z∈z1 ∧ ∀y(y∈x→z∈y)}. 
2  Since (z∈z1 ∧ ∀y(y∈x→z∈y))↔∀y(y∈x→z∈y), it follows that 
M{z:∀y(y∈x→z∈y)} and E!{z:∀y(y∈x→z∈y)} by lemma 1(i). Hence by lemma 
2(iii), [z:∀y(y∈x→z∈y)] ={z:∀y(y∈x→z∈y)}, whence ∩x={z:∀y(y∈x→z∈y)} by 
the definition of ∩. Hence M(∩x). 
 
 
We define the union of sets a and b to be the set of those things that are each members 
of a or of b. In symbols, where Ma and Mb, a∪b =df {z: z∈a ∨ z∈b}. 
 
	  
 THEOREM 21.  Union Let Mx and My. Then M(x∪y). 
 
 PROOF. 
1  With a view to using axiom 2(iii) we shall prove (i) mz(z∈x ∨ z∈y) and (ii) 
∃u∀z((z∈x ∨ z∈y)→z∈u). 
2  For (i), since Mx, it follows that mz z∈x by the definition of M; a fortiori mz(z∈x ∨ 
z∈y). 
3 For (ii), since Mx and My, it follows by theorem 16(i) that x⊆v and y⊆w for some 
levels v and w. By theorem 13, v∈w ∨ v=w ∨ w∈v. Suppose v∈w, then from x⊆v it 
follows that x∈w by theorem 8, whence x⊆w by the corollary of theorem 7. Since 
y⊆w too, it follows that ∀z((z∈x ∨ z∈y)→z∈w) by the definition of ⊆, whence 
∃u∀z((z∈x ∨ z∈y)→z∈u)). Suppose w∈v, then by similar reasoning x⊆v and y⊆v, 
whence ∃u∀z((z∈x ∨ z∈y)→z∈u)). Suppose v=w, then again both x⊆v and y⊆v, 
whence ∃u∀z((z∈x ∨ z∈y)→z∈u)) by similar reasoning. In each case, then, 
∃u∀z((z∈x ∨ z∈y)→z∈u)).  
4  From (i) and (ii), it follows that M{z: z∈x ∨ z∈y} by axiom 2(iii), whence M(x∪y) 
by the definition of x∪y. 
 
 
Where a is a set of sets, we define the union of a to be the set of those things that are 
each members of some member of a. In symbols, where Ma and ∀y(y∈a→My), ∪a=df 
{z: ∃y(y∈a ∧ z∈y)}.  
 
 THEOREM 22.  Generalized union  Let Mx and ∀y(y∈x→My). Then M(∪x). 
 
 PROOF. 
1  With a view to using axiom 2(iii) we shall prove (i) mz(∃y(y∈x ∧ z∈y)) and  
 (ii) ∃u∀z(∃y(y∈x ∧ z∈y)→z∈u).  
2  For (i), since Mx it follows that mz z∈x by the definition of M, whence z1∈x for 
some z1. From the hypothesis ∀y(y∈x→My) it follows that Mz1, whence mz z∈z1 
by the definition of M. Since ∀z(z∈z1→∃y(y∈x ∧ z∈y)), it follows that mz(∃y(y∈x 
∧ z∈y)).  
3  For (ii), since Mx it follows by theorem 16(i) that x⊆v for some level v. Hence 
∀z(∃y(y∈x ∧ z∈y)→∃y(y∈v ∧ z∈y)) by the definition of ⊆, whence ∀z(∃y(y∈x ∧ 
z∈y)→z∈v) by theorem 7. Hence ∃u∀z(∃y(y∈x ∧ z∈y)→z∈u) 
4  From (i) and (ii) it follows that M{z: ∃y(y∈x ∧ z∈y)} by axiom 2(iii), whence 
M(∪x) by the definition of ∪x.  
 
 
 THEOREM 23.  Sets and levels II Let Mx. Then ∃1v(x∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ x∈w)). 
 
This means that for any set there is a unique lowest level of which it is a member. 
 
 PROOF.   By theorem 16(i) x⊆u1 for some level u1. By axiom 2(iv) u1∈u2 for some 
level u2. Since x⊆u1 and u1∈u2, it follows that x∈u2 by theorem 8, whence ∃u x∈u. 
Hence ∃1v(x∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ x∈w)) by theorem 14. 
 
 
	  
The putative pair set {a, b} is defined as {z: z=a ∨ z=b}. 
 
 THEOREM 24.  Pairing  Let E!x and E!y and x≠y. Then M{x, y}. 
 
Our pairs are proper pairs—they have two members. Hence the condition x≠y. 
 
  
 PROOF. 
1  Since E!x and E!y and x≠y, it follows that mz(z=x ∨ z=y). By lemma 3, it follows 
from E!x and E!y that either (i) Ux ∧ Uy or (ii) Mx ∧ My or (iii) Mx ∧ Uy or (iv) Ux 
∧ My. With a view to using axiom 2(iii) we prove ∃u∀z(z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈u) for each 
case. 
2  For case (i), from Ux ∧ Uy ∧ x≠y it follows that mz1Uz1. Hence by axiom 2(i) 
M{z1:Uz1}, whence V1={z1:Uz1} by lemma 7(iii). Since (z=x ∨ z=y)→Uz, it follows 
that (z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈V1 by lemma 4(i). So ∃u∀z(z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈u) by the 
definition of V. 
3  For case (ii), from Mx ∧ My it follows by theorem 23 that x∈v and y∈w for some 
levels v, w.  By theorem 13, v∈w ∨ v=w ∨ w∈v. Suppose v∈w, then by theorem 7 
x∈w. Also y∈w, so ∃u∀z((z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈u). Suppose v=w, then x∈v and y∈v, 
whence ∃u∀z((z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈u). Suppose w∈v, then by theorem 7, y∈v. Also 
x∈v, so ∃u∀z((z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈u). From v∈w ∨ v=w ∨ w∈v, then, it follows that 
∃u∀z((z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈u).  
4  For case (iii), from Mx, it follows by theorem 23 that x∈v for some level v. By 
corollary (ii) of theorem 1 it follows from Uy that y∈v. Hence ∃u∀z((z=x ∨ 
z=y)→z∈u). 
5  For case (iv), ∃u∀z(z=x ∨ z=y)→x∈u) is proved by the same reasoning as in step 4. 
6  Since mz(z=x ∨ z=y) and ∃u∀z(z=x ∨ z=y)→z∈u), it follows by axiom 2(iii) that 
M{z: z=x ∨ z=y}, whence M{x, y} by the definition of {x, y}. 
 
 
We define the power set of a as the set, if any, of the subsets of a. In symbols,  
P(a) =df {y:y⊆a}. 
 
 THEOREM 25.  Power set   Let my y⊆x. Then M(P(x)). 
 
The hypothesis is necessary, since a pair set has only itself as a subset, and therefore 
has no power set. 
 
 PROOF.   From the hypothesis my y⊆x it follows that z⊆x for some z, whence Mx 
by lemma 6(i). Hence by theorem 23, x∈v for some level v, whence y⊆x→y∈v by 
theorem 8. Hence ∃u(∀y(y⊆x→y∈u). From my y⊆x and ∃u(∀y(y⊆x→y∈u), it follows 
that M{y:y⊆x} by axiom 2(iii), whence M(P(x)) by the definition of P(x). 
 
 
We define the power-plus set of a to be the set, if any, of the members and subsets of 
a. In symbols, P+(a) =df {y: y∈a ∨ y⊆a}.  
 
 THEOREM 26.  Power-plus set  Let Mx. Then M(P+(x)). 
	  
 
 PROOF.   From the hypothesis Mx it follows that my y∈x by the definition of M; a 
fortiori my(y∈x ∨ y⊆x). Also from Mx it follows that x∈v for some level v by theorem 
23. So y∈x→y∈v by theorem 7, and y⊆x→y∈v by theorem 8. Hence ∃u(∀y((y∈x ∨ 
y⊆x)→y∈u)). From my(y∈x ∨ y⊆x) and ∃u(∀y(y∈x ∨ y⊆x)→y∈u)), it follows that 
M{y:y∈x ∨ y⊆x} by axiom 2(iii), whence M(P+(x)) by the definition of P+(x). 
 
We now turn to further results about the structure and composition of levels.  
 
 THEOREM 27.  Membership and proper subset among levels v∈w↔v⊂w 
 
Since membership well-orders levels, and this theorem says that membership and 
proper subset are equivalent among levels, so proper subset well-orders levels too. 
 
 PROOF. 
1 For the → half, suppose v∈w. By corollary (i) of theorem 1 Mv, whence v⊆w by
 the corollary of theorem 7. By axiom 1(iii) v∉v, hence v≠w. So v⊂w by the 
 definition of ⊂.  
2  For the ← half, suppose v⊂w, then v⊆w and v≠w by the definition of ⊂, whence by 
theorem 13 v∈w ∨ w∈v. For a reductio suppose w∈v. Since v⊆w, it follows by the 
definition of ⊆ that w∈w, contrary to axiom 1(iii). Hence w∉v, whence v∈w. 
 
 
 THEOREM 28. The lowest level  (i) mzUz ↔ V1=℩v(¬∃w w∈v) 
       (ii) ∃xVx ↔ E!V1 
 
 PROOF OF (i). 
1 For the → half, suppose mzUz. Then by axiom 2(i) M{z:Uz}. Hence V1={z:Uz} by 
lemma 7(iii), whence E!V1 by the strength of identity. Hence ∃u u=u by the 
definition of V, whence ∃1v(v=v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ w=w)) by theorem 14. Hence 
E!℩v(¬∃w w∈v). By theorem 9(i), ¬∃w w∈V1. Hence V1=℩v(¬∃w w∈v). 
2  For the ← half, suppose V1=℩v(¬∃w w∈v). Then E!V1 by the strength of identity, 
whence by lemma 7(ii), ∃xMx. Hence by axiom 2(ii) mzUz. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii). 
1 For the → half, suppose	  ∃xVx. Then ∃xMx by corollary (i) of theorem 1, whence 
mzUz by axiom 2(ii). Hence E!V1 by theorem 28(i) and the strength of identity. 2	   For the ← half, suppose E!V1. Then ∃xVx by the definition of V.	  
 
 
 THEOREM 29. Levels next above I  E!u ↔ E!uʹ′ 
 
 PROOF. 
1  For the → half, suppose E!u. By axiom 2(iv) ∃u1 u∈u1. Hence by theorem 14 
∃1v(u∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ u∈w)), whence E!℩v(u∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ u∈w)). Hence 
E!uʹ′ by the definition of uʹ′. 
2  For the ← half , suppose E!uʹ′, then u∈uʹ′ by the definition of uʹ′. Hence E!u by 
axiom 1(i).  
	  
THEOREM 30.  Levels next above II    (i) uʹ′={x:Ux ∨ x⊆u}  
       (ii) uʹ′=P+(u) 
 
 PROOF OF (i).   By corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mu. Hence E!u by lemma 3, whence 
E!uʹ′ by theorem 29. By the definition of uʹ′, u∈uʹ′ and Vuʹ′. So Muʹ′ by corollary (i) of 
theorem 1. We tackle three cases separately: (i) uʹ′=V1, (ii) uʹ′=V2 and (ii) uʹ′≠V1 and 
uʹ′≠V2.  
 
Case (i) uʹ′=V1 
Since u∈uʹ′, it follows that u∈V1. But u∉V1 by theorem 9(i). Hence uʹ′={x:Ux ∨ x⊆u} 
by the tautology A∧¬A→B. 
 
Case (i) uʹ′=V2 
By the strength of identity E!V2. Hence ℩w(w∈V2)=V1 by theorem 9(ii). Since u∈V2, it 
follows that u=V1, whence (Ux ∨ x⊆V1)↔(Ux ∨ x⊆u). By lemma 7(iv) uʹ′=V2={x:Ux ∨ 
x⊆V1}, whence by lemma 1(i) uʹ′={x:Ux ∨ x⊆u}. 
 
Case (iii) uʹ′≠V1 and uʹ′≠V2 
1 We first prove w⊆u↔w∈uʹ′. For the → half, suppose w⊆u. From w⊆u and u∈uʹ′ it 
follows by theorem 8 that w∈uʹ′. For the ← half, suppose w∈uʹ′, then u∉w by the 
definition of uʹ′. Hence w∈u ∨ w=u by theorem 13. By corollary (i) of theorem 1, 
Mw. Suppose w∈u, then w⊆u by the corollary of theorem 7. Suppose w=u, then 
w⊆u by lemma 6(ii). 
2 Since E!uʹ′and uʹ′≠V1 and uʹ′≠V2, it follows by theorem 10(ii) that uʹ′=acc [w:w∈uʹ′]. 
whence uʹ′=acc {w:w∈uʹ′} by theorem 9(iii). By the definition of acc, acc 
{w:w∈uʹ′}= {x:(Ux ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈uʹ′}∧ (x∈y ∨ x⊆y)))}. Hence x∈uʹ′↔(Ux ∨ 
∃w1(w1∈uʹ′ ∧ (x∈w1 ∨ x⊆w1))) by lemma 4(i). We next prove x∈uʹ′↔(Ux ∨ x⊆u). 
3 For the → half, suppose x∈uʹ′, then E!x by axiom 1(i), whence Ux ∨ Mx by lemma 
3. Suppose Ux, a fortiori Ux ∨ ∃w1(w1∈uʹ′ ∧ x⊆w1). Suppose instead that Mx. Since 
x∈uʹ′, it follows that Ux ∨ ∃w1(w1∈uʹ′ ∧ (x∈w1 ∨ x⊆w1)), whence Ux ∨ ∃w1(w1∈uʹ′ 
∧ x⊆w1) by the corollary of theorem 7. Since w⊆u↔w∈uʹ′, it follows that Ux ∨ 
∃w1(w1⊆u ∧ x⊆w1). So Ux ∨ x⊆u by the definition of ⊆. 
4 For the ← half, suppose Ux, then x∈uʹ′. Suppose instead that x⊆u, then u⊆u by 
lemmas 6(ii), whence Ux ∨ ∃w1(w1⊆u ∧ x⊆w1). Since w⊆u↔w∈uʹ′, it follows that 
Ux ∨ ∃w1(w1∈uʹ′ ∧ x⊆w1), whence x∈uʹ′. 
5 Since x∈uʹ′↔(Ux ∨ x⊆u), it follows by lemma 1(i) that {x:x∈uʹ′}≡{x:Ux ∨ x⊆u}. 
Since Muʹ′, it follows by lemma 5(ii) that uʹ′={x:x∈uʹ′}, whence uʹ′={x:Ux ∨ x⊆u}. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii). 
1  By corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mu. Hence by theorem 26 M(P+(u)), whence  
E!P+(u) by lemma 3. So P+(u)={x:x∈u ∨ x⊆u} by the definition of P+(u), 
whence x∈P+(u)↔(x∈u ∨ x⊆u) by lemma 4(i). We shall prove x∈P+(u)↔(Ux ∨ 
x⊆u).  
2  For the → half, suppose x∈P+(u), then x∈u ∨ x⊆u. Suppose x∈u, then by axiom 
1(i) E!x, whence by lemma 3 Ux ∨ Mx. Suppose Ux, a fortiori Ux ∨ x⊆u. Suppose 
Mx, then by the corollary of theorem 7 x⊆u, a fortiori Ux ∨ x⊆u. Suppose instead 
that x⊆u, then again Ux ∨ x⊆u. 
	  
3  For the ← half, suppose Ux, then by corollary (ii) of theorem 1, x∈u, a fortiori x∈u 
∨ x⊆u. Hence x∈P+(u). Suppose instead that x⊆u, a fortiori x∈u ∨ x⊆u, whence 
x∈P+(u). 
4  Since x∈P+(u)↔(Ux ∨ x⊆u), it follows by lemma 1(i) that {x:x∈P+(u)}≡{x:Ux ∨ 
x⊆u}. Since M(P+(u)), it follows by lemma 5(ii) that P+(u)={x:x∈P+(u)}, whence 
P+(u)={x:Ux ∨ x⊆u}, and so uʹ′=P+(u) by theorem 30(i).  
 
 
 THEOREM 31.  Sets and levels III   
 Let Mx. Then (V*(x))ʹ′ = ℩v(x∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ x∈w)). 
 
This means that the level next above the level of a set is the lowest level of which the 
set is a member. 
 
 PROOF. 
1  Since by hypothesis Mx, it follows that ¬Ux by the definition of U. By theorem 
 16(ii) E!V*(x). Also V(V*(x)) by the definition of V*(x), whence by theorem 29 
 E!(V*(x))ʹ′. By theorem 30(i) (V*(x))ʹ′={x:Ux ∨ x⊆V*(x)}, whence by lemma 4(i) 
 x⊆V*(x)→x∈(V*(x))ʹ′. Since x⊆V*(x) by the definition of V*(x), it follows that 
 x∈(V*(x))ʹ′.  
2  For a reductio suppose that x∈w for some w∈(V*(x))ʹ′. By the definition of (V*(x))ʹ′ 
it follows that ¬∃w1(w1∈(V*(x))ʹ′ ∧ V*(x)∈w1). Hence V*(x)∉w, whence by 
theorem 13 V*(x)=w ∨ w∈V*(x). Suppose V*(x)=w, then x∈V*(x). Suppose instead 
that w∈V*(x), then x∈V*(x) by theorem 7. We next tackle three cases separately, 
deducing a contradiction in each case: (i) V*(x)=V1, (ii) V*(x)=V2, and (iii) 
V*(x)≠V1 and V*(x)≠V2. 
3 For case (i), by lemma 7(ii), x∈V*(x)↔Ux. Since x∈V*(x), it follows that Ux. 
Contradiction.  
4 For case (ii), by lemma 7(vi) and the definition of V, V(V1). Also by lemma 7(v), 
x∈V*(x)↔(Ux ∨ x⊆V1). Since x∈V*(x) and ¬Ux, it follows that x⊆V1. Since by 
lemma 7(vii) V1∈V2, it also follows that V1∈V*(x). But by the definition of V*(x), 
¬∃w1(w1∈V*(x) ∧ x⊆w1). Contradiction.  
5 For case (iii), by theorem 9(iii), [w:w∈V*(x)]={w:w∈V*(x)}, whence by theorem 
10(ii), V*(x)=acc {w:w∈V*(x)}. By the definition of acc, acc {w:w∈V*(x)}= 
 {z:(Uz ∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈V*(x)} ∧ (z∈y ∨ z⊆y)))}. Since x∈V*(x), it follows that Ux 
∨ ∃y(y∈{w:w∈V*(x)} ∧ (x∈y ∨ x⊆y)) by lemma 4(i). Since ¬Ux, it follows that 
∃y(y∈{w:w∈V*(x)} ∧ (x∈y ∨ x⊆y)), whence ∃w1(w1∈V*(x) ∧ (x∈w1 ∨ x⊆w1)) by 
lemma 4(i). Since Mx, it follows by the corollary of theorem 7 that ∃w1(w1∈V*(x) 
∧ x⊆w1). But by the definition of V*(x), ¬∃w1(w1∈V*(x) ∧ x⊆w1). Contradiction. 
6 Since a contradiction is derivable in each case, it follows that ¬∃w(w∈(V*(x))ʹ′ ∧ 
x∈w). By theorem 23 ∃1v(x∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ x∈w)), whence E!℩v(x∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v 
∧ x∈w)). Since x∈(V*(x))ʹ′ and ¬∃w(w∈(V*(x))ʹ′ ∧ x∈w), it follows that (V*(x))ʹ′= ℩v(x∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ x∈w)).  
 
 
  
THEOREM 32.  Levels next above III Let mx x⊆u. Then P+(u)=V1∪P(u). 
 
	  
Theorems 30(ii) and 32 jointly entail that uʹ′=V1∪P(u), provided u has many subsets. 
The condition is necessary, since when there are exactly two ur-elements, V1 has itself 
as its only subset, and hence its power set does not exist.  
 
 PROOF.  
1  Since mx x⊆u, it follows that M(P(u)) by theorem 25, whence by lemma 3 E!P(u). 
Hence P(u)={y:y⊆u} by the definition of P(u), whence by lemma 4(i) 
z∈P(u)↔z⊆u. By corollary (i) of theorem 1 Mu, and so by theorem 26, M(P+(u)). 
Hence by lemma 7(iii) V1={z:Uz}, whence MV1 and z∈V1↔Uz by lemma 4(i). By 
theorems 30(i) and (ii) and lemma 4(i), z∈P+(u)↔(Uz ∨ z⊆u), whence 
z∈P+(u)↔(z∈V1 ∨ z∈P(u)).  
2  Since MV1 and M(P(u)), it follows by theorem 21 that M(V1∪P(u)), whence 
E!(V1∪P(u)) by lemma 3. By the definition of ∪, V1∪P(u))={z: z∈V1 ∨ z∈P(u)}. 
Hence z∈(V1∪P(u))↔(z∈V1 ∨ z∈P(u)) by lemma 4(i). Since z∈P+(u)↔(z∈V1 ∨ 
z∈P(u)), it follows that z∈P+(u)↔z∈(V1∪P(u)).   
3  Since M(P+(u)) and M(V1∪P(u)) and z∈P+(u)↔z∈(V1∪P(u)), it follows by 
axiom 1(ii) that P+(u) = V1∪P(u). 
 
 
 THEOREM 33.  Limit levels I ∃uLu ↔ mx x=x 
 
 PROOF. 
1  For the → half, suppose ∃uLu. Then ∃xMx by corollary (i) of theorem 1. Hence 
mxUx by axiom 2(ii), whence mx x=x. 
2  For the ← half, suppose mx x=x. If ¬∃xMx then ∀xUx by lemma 3, whence mxUx. 
If ∃xMx then mxUx by axiom 2(ii). Hence either way mxUx, whence by axiom 2(i) 
M{x:Ux}. Hence E!V1 by lemma 7(iii) and the strength of identity. Hence ∃xVx by 
the definition of V, whence ∃uLu by axiom 2(v) and the definition of L. 
 
 
 THEOREM 34.  Limit levels II Let Lu. Then u=∪{w:w∈u}. 
 
 A limit level is the union of its history. 
 
 PROOF.  
1  By corollary (i) of theorem 1, Mu, whence E!u by lemma 3. Since Lu, it follows 
that u≠V1 by the definition of L. For a reductio suppose u=V2. Then E!V2 by the 
strength of identity, whence V2={z:Uz ∨ z⊆V1} and E!V1 by lemmas 7(iv) and (vi). 
By theorem 30(i), V1ʹ′={z:Uz ∨ z⊆V1}, whence V2=V1ʹ′.  Hence by the definition of 
V, ∃u1 V2=u1ʹ′, whence ¬LV2 by the definition of L. Contradiction. Hence u≠V2. 
Since E!u and u≠V1 and u≠V2, it follows by theorem 9(iii) that mw w∈u and 
[w:w∈u]={w:w∈u}. We shall prove z∈u↔∃w(w∈u ∧ z∈w).  
2  For the → half, suppose z∈u. By axiom 1(i) and lemma 3 Uz ∨ Mz. Suppose Uz. 
Then ∀v z∈v by corollary (ii) of theorem 1. Since ∃w w∈u, it follows that ∃w(w∈u 
∧ z∈w). Suppose instead that Mz. By theorem 16(ii) E!V*(z), whence V(V*(z)) by 
the definition of V*(z). Hence E!(V*(z))ʹ′ by theorem 29, whence ∃u1 (V*(z))ʹ′=u1ʹ′ 
by the definition of (V*(z))ʹ′. Hence u≠(V*(z))ʹ′ by the definition of L, whence by 
theorem 13 u∈(V*(z))ʹ′ ∨ (V*(z))ʹ′∈u. For a reductio suppose u∈(V*(z))ʹ′. Since z∈u, 
	  
it follows that ∃w(w∈(V*(z))ʹ′ ∧ z∈w)). But (V*(z))ʹ′ = ℩v(z∈v ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ z∈w)) 
by theorem 31. Contradiction. Hence (V*(z))ʹ′∈u, whence ∃w(w∈u ∧ z∈w).  
3  For the ← half, suppose ∃w(w∈u ∧ z∈w). Then z∈u by theorem 7. 
4  Since [w:w∈u]={w:w∈u}, it follows that M{w:w∈u} by lemma 4(i). Also by 
lemma 4(i), ∀y(y∈{w:w∈u}→Vy), whence ∀y(y∈{w:w∈u}→My) by corollary (i) 
of theorem 1. Hence M(∪{w:w∈u}) by theorem 22. Hence E!∪{w:w∈u}) by 
lemma 3, whence ∪{w:w∈u}={z: ∃y(y∈{w:w∈u}∧ z∈y)} by the definition of 
∪{w:w∈u}. Hence z∈∪{w:w∈u}↔∃y(y∈{w:w∈u}∧ z∈y) by lemma 4(i), whence  
 z∈∪{w:w∈u}↔∃w(w∈u ∧ z∈w) by lemma 4(i) again. Since z∈u↔∃w(w∈u ∧ 
z∈w), it follows that z∈u↔ z∈∪{w:w∈u}. Since Mu and M(∪{w:w∈u}) and 
z∈u↔ z∈∪{w:w∈u}, it follows by axiom 1(ii) that u=∪{w:w∈u}. 
 
 
We define Vω to be the lowest limit level. In symbols, Vω =df  ℩v(Lv ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ 
Lw)).  
 
 THEOREM 35.  The lowest limit level E!Vω ↔ ∃uLu 
 
 PROOF. 
1  For the → half, suppose E!Vω. Then ∃uLu by the definition of Vω. 
2  For the ← half, suppose ∃uLu. Then ∃1v(Lv ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ Lw)) by theorem 14. 
 Hence E! ℩v(Lv ∧ ¬∃w(w∈v ∧ Lw)), whence E!Vω by the definition of Vω. 
 
 
We define a to be inductive if (i) V1 belongs to a and (ii) the level next above any 
level belonging to a also belongs to a. In symbols, Ia=df V1∈a ∧ ∀v(v∈a→vʹ′∈a).  
 
 THEOREM 36.   Vω is inductive  Let E!Vω. Then I(Vω). 
 
 PROOF. 
1 From the hypothesis E!Vω it follows by the definition of Vω that V(Vω) whence 
MVω by corollary (i) of theorem 1. Hence E!V1 by lemma 7(iii) and the strength of 
identity, whence V(V1) by the definition of V. 
2  By theorem 13, V1∈Vω ∨ V1=Vω ∨ Vω∈V1. But V1≠Vω by the definitions of L and 
Vω, and Vω∉V1 by theorem 9(i). Hence V1∈Vω. 
3  Consider an arbitrary u∈Vω. Then E!u by axiom 1(i). Hence E!uʹ′ by theorem 29, 
whence Vuʹ′ by the definition of uʹ′. Hence uʹ′∈Vω ∨ uʹ′=Vω ∨ Vω∈uʹ′ by theorem 13. 
Since ∃x uʹ′=xʹ′ it follows that uʹ′≠Vω by the definitions of L and Vω. Also Vω∉uʹ′ by 
the definition of uʹ′. Hence uʹ′∈Vω. Since u was arbitrary we can generalize to get 
∀v(v∈Vω→vʹ′∈Vω). Hence I(Vω) by the definition of I. 
 
 
	  
We define N* to be the set of the members common to every inductive set. In 
symbols, N* =df {x:∀y(Iy→x∈y)}. N* represents the set of natural numbers. 
 
 THEOREM 37.  N* is inductive  Let mx x=x. Then I(N*). 
 
 PROOF.  
1  Since by hypothesis mx x=x it follows that E!Vω by theorems 33 and 35, whence 
M(Vω) by the definition of Vω and corollary (i) of theorem 1, and also I(Vω) by 
theorem 36. By the definition of I, Iy→(V1∈y ∧ V1ʹ′∈y), whence V1∈Vω ∧ V1ʹ′∈Vω. 
Hence E!V1 and E!V1ʹ′ by axiom 1(i). By the reasoning in step 1 of the proof of 
theorem 34, V1ʹ′=V2. Hence V1≠V1ʹ′ by lemma 7(viii), whence mx(x∈Vω ∧ 
∀y(Iy→x∈y)).  
2  Since M(Vω)and mx(x∈Vω ∧ ∀y(Iy→x∈y)), it follows that M{x: x∈Vω ∧ 
∀y(Iy→x∈y)} by theorem 18. Since I(Vω) it follows that (x∈Vω ∧ ∀y(Iy→x∈y))↔ 
∀y(Iy→x∈y), whence M{x:∀y(Iy→x∈y)} by lemma 1(i). Hence E!N* by lemma 3 
and the definition of N*, whence N*={x:∀y(Iy→x∈y)}. 
3 By the definition of I it follows that ∀y(Iy→V1∈y), whence V1∈N* by lemma 4(i). 
Consider an arbitrary u∈N*. Then ∀y(Iy→u∈y) by lemma 4(i). By the definition 
of I it follows that ∀y(Iy→∀v(v∈y→vʹ′∈y)). Hence ∀y(Iy→uʹ′∈y), whence uʹ′∈N* 
by lemma 4(i). Since u was arbitrary we can generalize to get ∀v(v∈N*→vʹ′∈N*). 
Hence I(N*) by the definition of I. 
 
 
We define [a, b] as [z:z=a ∨ z=b] and use this shorthand in the following definition of 
the ordered pair  
 
<a, b> =df {{{[a, V1], [a, V2]}, V1}, {{[b, V1], [b, V2]}, V2}}. 
 
 THEOREM 38.  Ordered pairs 
 Let mx x=x. Then (i) E!<x, y> and (ii) <x, y>=<w, z> ↔ (x≡w ∧ y≡z). 
 
(i) ensures the existence of ordered pairs, while (ii) says that they have their so-called 
characteristic property. Here we supply sketches for the interested reader to develop 
into full-dress proofs. 
 
The proof of (i) is by repeated application of pairing (theorem 24), having established 
on each occasion that the members of the next putative pair exist and are distinct.  At 
the start it is shown that E![x, V1] and E![x, V2] and [x, V1]≠[x, V2], and similarly for y. 
Four cases for each of x and y need to be tackled here, which between them exhaust 
the possibilities: zilch, V1, V2, anything else. 
 
By definition an ordered pair <a, b> is of the form {a*, b*}, where a* codes 
coordinate a, and b* codes b. The markers V1 and V2 serve to distinguish the two. The 
proof of the → half of (ii) proceeds by showing that different coordinates have 
different codes, i.e. a*=b*→a≡b. Four cases for a*=b* need to be tackled here, which 
correspond to the four possibilities for a and b: zilch, V1, V2, anything else. Supposing 
	  
<x, y>=<w, z>, it follows that x*≠y* and w*≠z* which in turn entail x*=w* and y*=z*. 
Since a*=b*→a≡b, it follows that x≡w ∧ y≡z. The proof of the ← half proceeds by 
showing that different items code different coordinates, i.e. a≡b→a*=b*. Supposing 
x≡w ∧ y≡z, it follows that {x*, y*}≡{w*, z*}, i.e. <x, y>≡<w, z>, whence  
<x, y>=<w, z> by (i).  
 
 
 THEOREM 39.  Non-existence   (i) ¬E!{x:E!x} 
    (ii) ¬E!{x:Mx} 
    (iii) ¬E!{x:Vx} 
    (iv) ¬E!{x:𝒜x} 
    (v) ¬E!{x:Hx}             
 
This theorem means that there are no sets corresponding to the predicates E!, M, V, 𝒜 
and H. By corollary (ii) of theorem 1, every ur-element is a member of every level, 
and by theorem 23, every set is a member of some level. But it follows from (i) that 
there can be no all-encompassing level. A level is, in Scott’s phrase, never more than 
a partial universe.  
 
 PROOF OF (i).   For a reductio suppose E!{x:E!x}. Then {x:E!x}={x:E!x}, whence 
by lemma 4(i) {x:E!x}∈{x:E!x}, contrary to axiom 1(iii). Hence ¬E!{x:E!x}. 
 
 PROOF OF (ii).   For a reductio suppose E!{x:Mx}. Then {x:Mx}={x:Mx}, whence 
M{x:Mx} by lemma 4(i). Hence also by lemma 4(i) {x:Mx}∈{x:Mx}, contrary to 
axiom 1(iii). Hence ¬E!{x:Mx}. 
 
 PROOF OF (iii).   For a reductio suppose E!{x:Vx}. Then {x:Vx}={x:Vx}, whence 
M{x:Vx} by lemma 4(i), whence by theorem 16(i) {x:Vx}⊆v for some level v. Hence 
by the definition of ⊆, y∈{x:Vx}→y∈v, whence by lemma 4(i) v∈v, contrary to axiom 
1(iii). Hence ¬E!{x:Vx}. 
 
 PROOF OF (iv).  
1 For a reductio suppose E!{x:𝒜x}. Then {x:𝒜x}={x:𝒜x}, whence M{x:𝒜x} by 
lemma 4(i). Hence by theorem 16(i), {x:𝒜x}⊆v for some level v.  By axiom 2(iv) 
it follows that v∈w for some level w, whence by axiom 1(iii), v≠w. Hence mxVx.  
2 Since Vx→𝒜x by theorem 1(iii), it follows that mx(𝒜x∧Vx), whence by theorem 
18, M{x:𝒜x∧Vx}.  
3 Since Vx→𝒜x, it follows that 𝒜x∧Vx ↔ Vx, whence by lemma 1(i), M{x:Vx}. 
Hence E!{x:Vx} by lemma 3, contrary to theorem 39(iii). Hence ¬E!{x:𝒜x}. 
 
 PROOF OF (v).  
1  For a reductio suppose E!{x:Hx}. Then {x:Hx}={x:Hx}. Hence M{x:Hx} by lemma 
4(i), whence by theorem 16(i) {x:Hx}⊆v, for some level v. Hence by the definition 
of ⊆, y∈{x:Hx}→y∈v, whence by lemma 4(i) Hy→y∈v.  
2  Consider an arbitrary level u. By axiom 2(iv), u∈v and v∈w for some levels v, w. 
Hence u∈w by theorem 7. By axiom 1(iii), u≠v, whence mw1(w1∈w). Hence by 
theorems 9(i), (ii) and (iii), [w1:w1∈w]={w1:w1∈w}, whence by lemma 4(i), 
u∈[w1:w1∈w] and by the strength of identity E![w1:w1∈w]. By theorem 11, 
	  
H[w1:w1∈w]. Hence ∃y(Hy ∧ u∈y). Since u was arbitrary, we can generalize to get 
∀u1∃y(Hy ∧ u1∈y). 
3  Since Hy→y∈v, it follows that ∀u1∃y(y∈v ∧ u1∈y), whence ∀u1 u1∈v by theorem 
7. Hence v∈v, contrary to axiom 1(iii), whence ¬E!{x:Hx}.    
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